This document appears to be page 62 of a publication titled 'Are the Androids Dreaming Yet?', included in House Oversight evidence files. It analyzes the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster as a case study in communication failure and cognitive bias, specifically how engineers failed to effectively convey the ambiguity and danger of the foam strike to management. The text highlights how the focus was misdirected toward tiles rather than the leading edge of the wing.
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Engineers | Technical Staff |
Discussed the shuttle damage in private; presented cleaned-up analysis to management.
|
| Management | Leadership |
Received one-way communication of conclusions regarding the shuttle damage.
|
| Shuttle Team | Operational Team |
Did not have a full discussion of the possibilities regarding the damage.
|
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| House Oversight Committee |
Source of the document (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015752)
|
|
| NASA |
Implied organization managing the Space Shuttle.
|
"The truth is you simply don’t know. If you are puzzling over the strength of tiles, you have been misdirected."Source
"It was bad. The foam, a very tough material, had hit the leading edge of the wing, a weak point, punching a hole through it."Source
"The result: people passively listened to the information rather"Source
Complete text extracted from the document (1,226 characters)
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