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At the other end of the spectrum, using military means in the short term to
guarantee prevention would entail a vast use of force -- essentially an
unofficial, semipermanent occupation of Iran. This is not a viable path,
particularly since other diplomatic possibilities have not yet been
exhausted.

Similarly, sanctions, while effective, are not sufficient by themselves.
They must be intertwined with negotiations -- as Washington and its allies
increase the pressure, cohesive and meaningful talks with equivalent
concessions should follow suit. Some have argued that negotiations should
expand to a "big for big" format, but decades of mistrust between the
United States and Iran make smaller deals more practical. Such an
approach would have to focus on ending Iran's most problematic
enrichment activity: processing uranium to the 20 percent threshold, which
makes the leap to weapons-grade material much easier. Instead, the regime
could limit itself to 5 percent enrichment, and under strict supervision by
the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The intelligence community widely believes that although Iran has not yet
decided to make a nuclear weapon, it is still moving to acquire all the
necessary capabilities in case it chooses that path. Accordingly,
Washington will need to obtain a concrete Iranian commitment to convert
its stocks of readily upgradeable gaseous uranium into metallic fuel
elements, which pose significantly less of a threat. A serious inspection
system would need to be implemented in order to monitor these
requirements. In return, the Iranians would expect the lifting of nuclear-
related sanctions. They would also likely ask for acknowledgement that
they have the right to continue their civil enrichment program, whether for
supposed use in cancer treatment or to safeguard against a potential
Russian decision to cease fueling the Bushehr reactor.

Thus far, President Obama has been frustrated at the lack of progress in
response to his openness toward the Iranian regime, and his new cabinet
has an obligation to help him solidify a negotiating position that improves
the situation. If the Iranians continue to reject U.S. positions that
seemingly respond to some of their demands, then the administration
should begin applying other pressures. These steps should be taken sooner

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