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alternative positions, have, for the first time in decades, put those
who reject objectivism in ethics on the defensive.
On What Matters is a book of daunting length: two large volumes,
totaling more than 1,400 pages, of densely argued text. But the core
of the argument comes in the first 400 pages, which is not an
insurmountable challenge for the intellectually curious – particularly
given that Parfit, in the best tradition of English-language
philosophy, always strives for lucidity, never using obscure words
where simple ones will do. Each sentence is straightforward, the
argument is clear, and Parfit often uses vivid examples to make his
points. Thus, the book is an intellectual treat for anyone who wants to
understand not so much “what matters” as whether anything really
can matter, in an objective sense.
Many people assume that rationality is always instrumental: reason
can tell us only how to get what we want, but our basic wants and
desires are beyond the scope of reasoning. Not so, Parfit argues. Just
as we can grasp the truth that 1 + 1 = 2, so we can see that I have a
reason to avoid suffering agony at some future time, regardless of
whether I now care about, or have desires about, whether I will suffer
agony at that time. We can also have reasons (though not always
conclusive reasons) to prevent others from suffering agony. Such self-
evident normative truths provide the basis for Parfit’s defense of
objectivity in ethics.
One major argument against objectivism in ethics is that people
disagree deeply about right and wrong, and this disagreement extends
to philosophers who cannot be accused of being ignorant or
confused. If great thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham
disagree about what we ought to do, can there really be an objectively
true answer to that question?
Parfit’s response to this line of argument leads him to make a claim
that is perhaps even bolder than his defense of objectivism in ethics.

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