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testified at trial, gave evidence that she had been
sexually abused when transported across state lines
as a minor. Counts Three and Four thus qualify as
offenses, and § 3283 applies to those offenses.
Second, Maxwell argues that Counts Three, Four,
and Six of the Indictment are barred by the statute of
limitations because the extended statute of limitations
provided by the 2003 amendment to § 3283 does not
apply to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, the Supreme Court held that a court,
in deciding whether a statute applies retroactively,
must first "determine whether Congress has expressly
prescribed the statute's proper reach."23 If Congress
has done so, "the inquiry ends, and the court enforces
the statute as it is written."24 If the statute "is
ambiguous or contains no express command regarding
retroactivity, a reviewing court must determine whether
applying the statute to antecedent conduct would
create presumptively impermissible retroactive effects."25
Here, the inquiry is straightforward. In 2003, Con-
gress amended § 3283 to provide: "No statute of
limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution
for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse,
or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years
shall preclude such prosecution during the life of
the child."26 The text of § 3283-that no statute of
23 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); see also Weingarten, 865 F.3d at
54-55.
24 In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d
401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
25 Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 55 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
26 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 650, 660
(2003).
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