HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011802.jpg
2.19 MB
Extraction Summary
9
People
5
Organizations
11
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Memoir/book excerpt (likely ehud barak's autobiography) included in house oversight committee evidence
File Size:
2.19 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 331 from a memoir (likely Ehud Barak's) contained within House Oversight Committee files. The text recounts high-level peace negotiations involving Israel, Palestine, and Syria in the late 1990s, detailing a specific metaphorical conversation between Barak and Arafat witnessed by Bill Clinton regarding mutual destruction if peace fails. It also details diplomatic back-channels involving Michael Levy and Madeleine Albright to set up negotiations with Syria over the Golan Heights.
People (9)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ehud Barak | Narrator/Author (Implied 'I') |
Former Prime Minister of Israel, describing negotiations with Arafat and Assad.
|
| Bill Clinton | President of the United States |
Observing the conversation between Barak and Arafat.
|
| Yasser Arafat | Palestinian Leader |
Being spoken to by Barak regarding peace negotiations and shared risk.
|
| Hafez al-Assad | President of Syria |
Signaled willingness to resume talks without preconditions.
|
| Michael Levy | British Labor Party member / Envoy |
Described as a 'friend' of Barak; visiting Damascus as Tony Blair's roving Mideast envoy.
|
| Tony Blair | Prime Minister of the UK |
Mentioned in relation to his envoy, Michael Levy.
|
| Madeleine Albright | Secretary of State |
Received message from Assad regarding peace talks.
|
| Farouk al-Sharaa | Syrian Foreign Minister |
Sent by Assad to meet Barak in Washington.
|
| Benjamin 'Bibi' Netanyahu | Former Prime Minister of Israel |
Mentioned as having been ready to give up the Golan Heights previously.
|
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| British Labor Party |
Political affiliation of Michael Levy.
|
|
| Likud |
Israeli political party expected to denounce concessions to Syria.
|
|
| Labor Party (Israel) |
Political affiliation of many Golan settlers.
|
|
| Syrian Intelligence Service |
Described as crushing dissidence.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Source of the document stamp.
|
Timeline (2 events)
December 1999 (Scheduled)
Late 1999 (implied)
Meeting at an ambassador's apartment involving Barak, Arafat, and Clinton.
Ambassador's fifth-floor apartment
Locations (11)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Location of the conversation with Arafat.
|
|
|
Mentioned as a location with innocent people at risk.
|
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Mentioned as a location with innocent people at risk.
|
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Mentioned as a location with innocent people at risk.
|
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Mentioned as a location with innocent people at risk.
|
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Mentioned as a location with innocent people at risk.
|
|
|
Location the narrator returned from.
|
|
|
Where Michael Levy visited.
|
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|
Location for scheduled talks in December.
|
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Territory subject to negotiation and domestic political tension.
|
|
|
Compared to Golan Heights regarding settler population.
|
Relationships (2)
Referred to as 'my British Labor Party friend Michael Levy'
Levy described as 'Tony Blair’s roving Mideast envoy'
Key Quotes (4)
"Imagine that we each have parachutes, and we’re going to jump together. But I have my hand on your ripcord, and you are holding mine."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011802.jpg
Quote #1
"And if we don’t jump, many, many innocent people who are now walking the streets of Gaza and Ramallah and Hebron, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, will die."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011802.jpg
Quote #2
"President Assad suddenly signalled his willingness to resume talks without any preconditions"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011802.jpg
Quote #3
"In Israel, however, every sign of a concession would risk igniting charges that we were 'selling out' to Syria."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011802.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,421 characters)
/ BARAK / 45
responsibility to support the other. With President Clinton looking on, I steered
Arafat toward the window of the ambassador’s fifth-floor apartment. “Look
down,” I said. “Imagine that we each have parachutes, and we’re going to jump
together. But I have my hand on your ripcord, and you are holding mine. To land
safely we have to help each other… And if we don’t jump, many, many innocent
people who are now walking the streets of Gaza and Ramallah and Hebron, Tel
Aviv and Jerusalem, will die.” Arafat again just nodded, leaving me, and the
President, unsure whether anything I’d said had struck home.
Arafat toward the window of the ambassador’s fifth-floor apartment. “Look
down,” I said. “Imagine that we each have parachutes, and we’re going to jump
together. But I have my hand on your ripcord, and you are holding mine. To land
safely we have to help each other… And if we don’t jump, many, many innocent
people who are now walking the streets of Gaza and Ramallah and Hebron, Tel
Aviv and Jerusalem, will die.” Arafat again just nodded, leaving me, and the
President, unsure whether anything I’d said had struck home.
The true test of that would come only when we got to the stage of negotiations
when the “difficult decisions” could not be evaded. Yet only weeks after I returned
from Oslo, the focus did finally shift to the Syrians. President Assad suddenly
signalled his willingness to resume talks without any preconditions – a message he
delivered first to my British Labor Party friend Michael Levy, who was visiting
Damascus as Tony Blair’s roving Mideast envoy, and then to Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright. Assad said he would send Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-
Sharaa to meet me for initial talks in Washington in December, ahead of a full-
scale, US-mediated attempt to negotiate peace at the start of the new year.
when the “difficult decisions” could not be evaded. Yet only weeks after I returned
from Oslo, the focus did finally shift to the Syrians. President Assad suddenly
signalled his willingness to resume talks without any preconditions – a message he
delivered first to my British Labor Party friend Michael Levy, who was visiting
Damascus as Tony Blair’s roving Mideast envoy, and then to Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright. Assad said he would send Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-
Sharaa to meet me for initial talks in Washington in December, ahead of a full-
scale, US-mediated attempt to negotiate peace at the start of the new year.
* * *
The broad terms of a potential deal had long been clear, both to us and the
Syrians. The danger was always that the process would get derailed, or never really
get started, due to domestic political opposition. Syria had a tightly state-controlled
media and an intelligence service concerned mainly with crushing any signs of
dissidence. That meant Assad’s main concern was to ensure broad support, or at
least acquiescence, from top military and party figures. In Israel, however, every
sign of a concession would risk igniting charges that we were “selling out” to
Syria. The Likud and the political right would obviously denounce the idea of
giving up the Golan Heights, even though Bibi had been ready to do just that when
he was Prime Minister. But even on the left, there was little enthusiasm for
returning the Golan. There were far fewer Israeli settlers there than on the West
Bank, not even 20,000. But most of them, far from being religiously motivated
ideologues, were Labor supporters. And almost no Israel, of any political stripe,
Syrians. The danger was always that the process would get derailed, or never really
get started, due to domestic political opposition. Syria had a tightly state-controlled
media and an intelligence service concerned mainly with crushing any signs of
dissidence. That meant Assad’s main concern was to ensure broad support, or at
least acquiescence, from top military and party figures. In Israel, however, every
sign of a concession would risk igniting charges that we were “selling out” to
Syria. The Likud and the political right would obviously denounce the idea of
giving up the Golan Heights, even though Bibi had been ready to do just that when
he was Prime Minister. But even on the left, there was little enthusiasm for
returning the Golan. There were far fewer Israeli settlers there than on the West
Bank, not even 20,000. But most of them, far from being religiously motivated
ideologues, were Labor supporters. And almost no Israel, of any political stripe,
331
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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011802
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