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2.13 MB
Extraction Summary
6
People
3
Organizations
7
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book manuscript / memoir page (evidence file)
File Size:
2.13 MB
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript (likely by Ehud Barak, former Prime Minister of Israel) contained within House Oversight evidence files. It details Barak's first visit to the US as Prime Minister in 1999, describing a gala dinner with his wife Nava, and a subsequent trip to Camp David with President Clinton. The text focuses on diplomatic strategy, the peace process with Syria and Oslo, and the personal rapport established between Barak and Clinton, noting that Barak benefited from 'not being Bibi' (Netanyahu).
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ehud Barak | Prime Minister of Israel (implied author) |
Author of the text ('Me/I'), discussing his first visit to the US as Prime Minister.
|
| Bill Clinton | US President |
Hosted the author for a working visit, gala, and Camp David retreat.
|
| Nava Barak | Wife of Ehud Barak |
Attended the gala dinner at the White House.
|
| Madeleine Albright | Secretary of State |
Mentioned as a senior US negotiator whom the author sometimes bypassed to deal directly with the President.
|
| Dennis Ross | Mideast Envoy |
Mentioned as a senior US negotiator whom the author sometimes bypassed.
|
| Benjamin Netanyahu (Bibi) | Former Prime Minister of Israel |
Referenced as 'Bibi'; the author suggests his relationship with Clinton benefited from simply NOT being him.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| US Government | ||
| White House | ||
| State Department |
Timeline (3 events)
July 1999
July 1999
Locations (7)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
Relationships (2)
Spent 10 hours discussing security; established a pattern of direct face-to-face negotiation; noted good chemistry.
Barak notes his preference for dealing with Clinton may have frustrated her.
Key Quotes (4)
"I benefited, I’m sure, simply by not being Bibi."Source
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Quote #1
"On almost all key issues, my preference was to deal directly with the President, something I know sometimes frustrated other senior US negotiators"Source
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Quote #2
"decisions on which negotiations would succeed or fail would have to be made at the top"Source
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Quote #3
"Much is often made about the personal 'chemistry' in political relationships."Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,369 characters)
/ BARAK / 38
redeployments – on only the land part of a land-for-peace deal – meant we risked ignoring the core issues that would determine whether a full peace agreement was achievable.
More urgently, I knew from our diplomats in the US that the Americans would not necessarily be receptive to a further delay in moving ahead with Oslo, even if it meant focusing on trying to make peace with Syria. That made my first visit to see President Clinton as Prime Minister especially important.
* * *
It was billed as a “working visit” and work we did. After a gala dinner for Nava and me in the White House, we helicoptered to the presidential retreat at Camp David. President Clinton and I spent more than 10 hours discussing shared security challenges in the Middle East, especially terrorist groups and states like Iran that were backing them, and, of course, how best to move forward our efforts to negotiate peace. These face-to-face meetings set a pattern that would last throughout the time he and I were in office. On almost all key issues, my preference was to deal directly with the President, something I know sometimes frustrated other senior US negotiators like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Mideast envoy Dennis Ross. This was not out of any disrespect for them. It was because the decisions on which negotiations would succeed or fail would have to be made at the top, just as President Clinton and I would ultimately carry the responsibility, or the blame, for errors, missteps or missed opportunities.
Our first meeting ran until three in the morning. When the President asked me how I saw the peace process going forward, he smiled, in obviously relief, at my answer: I wanted to move quickly. He had only a limited time left in office, and I was determined that we not waste it. Much is often made about the personal “chemistry” in political relationships. Too much, I think, because the core issues, and the trade-offs of substance, are what truly matter when negotiating matters of the weight, and long-term implications, of Middle East peace. Still, chemistry does help when moments of tension or crisis arise, as they inevitably do. My first few days with President Clinton laid a foundation that allowed us to work together even when things got tough. I benefited, I’m sure, simply by not being Bibi. The
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