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Extraction Summary

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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes

Document Information

Type: Court filing / judicial opinion (exhibit)
File Size: 740 KB
Summary

This document is Page 71 of 80 from a filing in the Ghislaine Maxwell case (Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE), filed on July 2, 2021. The content is an excerpt from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion overturning Bill Cosby's conviction ([J-100-2020]), discussing the legal principle of 'reasonable reliance' on a prosecutor's public promise not to prosecute. This precedent was likely submitted by Maxwell's defense to argue for the validity of the Epstein Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA).

People (3)

Name Role Context
Cosby Defendant (in cited case)
Subject of the legal opinion regarding reliance on a prosecutor's promise not to prosecute.
D.A. Castor District Attorney
Made a public announcement regarding a charging decision that Cosby relied upon.
Justice Black Supreme Court Justice (Historical)
Cited for an explanation regarding the necessity of counsel and knowledge in the criminal justice process.

Organizations (3)

Name Type Context
The Commonwealth
Prosecuting authority (Pennsylvania) in the Cosby case.
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Indicated by the Bates stamp (DOJ-OGR).
United States District Court
Implied by case number 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (SDNY).

Timeline (1 events)

2021-07-02
Document filed in Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell).
Court

Relationships (1)

Cosby Legal/Adversarial D.A. Castor
Cosby relied on Castor's public announcement regarding charging decisions.

Key Quotes (3)

"If Cosby’s reliance was unreasonable... then reasonableness would require a defendant in a similar position to disbelieve an elected district attorney’s public statement and to discount the experience and wisdom of his own counsel."
Source
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Quote #1
"We find nothing unreasonable about Cosby’s reliance upon his attorneys and upon D.A. Castor’s public announcement of the Commonwealth’s charging decision."
Source
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Quote #2
"We decline to construe as unreasonable the failure to do that which the law does not require."
Source
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Quote #3

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,140 characters)

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 71 of 80
To hold otherwise would recast our understanding of reasonableness into
something unrecognizable and unsustainable under our law. If Cosby’s reliance was
unreasonable, as found by the lower courts and as suggested by the Commonwealth,
then reasonableness would require a defendant in a similar position to disbelieve an
elected district attorney’s public statement and to discount the experience and wisdom of
his own counsel. This notion of reasonableness would be manifestly unjust in this context.
Defendants, judges, and the public would be forced to assume fraud or deceit by the
prosecutor. The attorney-client relationship would be predicated upon mistrust, and the
defendant would be forced to navigate the criminal justice process on his own, despite
the substantial deficit in the critical knowledge that is necessary in order to do so, as so
compellingly explained by Justice Black.
Such an understanding of reasonableness is untenable. Instead of facilitating the
right to counsel, it undermines that right. We reject this interpretation. We find nothing
unreasonable about Cosby’s reliance upon his attorneys and upon D.A. Castor’s public
announcement of the Commonwealth’s charging decision.
The trial court alternatively suggested that Cosby’s belief that he would never be
prosecuted, thus stripping him of his Fifth Amendment rights, based upon little more than
a press release, was unreasonable because neither Cosby nor his attorneys demanded
that the terms of any offers or assurances by D.A. Castor be reduced to writing. This
reasoning is unpersuasive. Neither the trial court, nor the Commonwealth for that matter,
cites any legal principle that requires a prosecutor’s assurances to be memorialized in
writing in order to warrant reasonable reliance. We decline to construe as unreasonable
the failure to do that which the law does not require.
It also has been suggested that the level of the defendant’s sophistication is a
relevant factor in assessing whether his reliance upon a prosecutor’s decision was
[J-100-2020] - 70
DOJ-OGR-00004883

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