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that the Russian intelligence service managed to bring him under its sway during his 33 days in Hong Kong.

The Russian intelligence service even might have been aware of Snowden, and his anti-NSA activities, before his arrival on May 20, 2013. Snowden, as discussed earlier, was anything but discrete in his contacts with strangers in the anti-surveillance movement, including such well known activists as Runa Sandvik (who he supplied his true name and address via email), Micah Lee, Jacob Appelbaum, Parker Higgins, and Laura Poitras. “It is not statistically improbable that members of this circle were being watched by a hostile service,” a former NSA counterintelligence officer told me in 2015. When I told him that Poitras and others in her circle had used PGP encryption, aliases and TOR software in their exchanges with Snowden, he said, arching his eyebrows, “That might work against amateurs, but it wouldn’t stop the Russians if they thought they might have a defector in the NSA.” He explained that both the NSA and hostile services have the “means” to bypass such safeguards.

I next asked him what the Russian intelligence service would have done if they had indeed spotted Snowden in late 2012 or early 2013. “Maybe just research him,” he replied. As we know now, he pointed out. Russia and China probably had access the 127-page standard form in his personnel file that he updated in 2011. They also had the capability to track his air travel to Hong Kong. “Could someone have steered him to Hong Kong?” I asked. He answered. With a shrug, “That depends on whether Snowden had a confidante who could have influenced him.”

Whenever adversaries became aware of Snowden in this scenario, it was not until after Snowden copied the NSA secrets and took them with him to Hong Kong that Russian intelligence officers offered him a deal. So from the Russian point of view, Snowden had already burnt his bridges. Since he had used other people’s passwords to get into computers that he was not authorized to use, illegally moved documents and gave a false reason for his medical leave, it was only a matter of time before NSA investigators would identify him as a possible spy. He could be of no further use to an adversary at the NSA. His intelligence value now lay in the documents he had taken with him or stored in the cloud as well as his ability to help clarify them in debriefing sessions. In addition, he could have a further use to an adversary, especially if he agreed to cooperate. By virtue of his position as a former insider, he could inflict damage on the morale and public standing of the NSA by denouncing its spying in the media. So once in Hong Kong, the Russians would have no reason to restrain him from holding a press event or releasing a video, In fact, in the past the KGB had organized press conferences for all the previous NSA defectors to Moscow. Hong Kong also might be seen as a perfect venue for a well-staged media event since all the major newspapers in the world had bureaus there. And his disclosures about the NSA spying coming under the mantle of whistle-blowing could serve to weaken the NSA’s relations with its allies. The event would also serve to deflect suspicion from any other potential spies in the NSA, if any existed. Snowden’s going public on June 9th 2013 provided that opportunity.

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