HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749.jpg
1.45 MB
Extraction Summary
4
People
7
Organizations
4
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book page / evidence file
File Size:
1.45 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 261 from a book about espionage, included in House Oversight files related to an investigation (likely Epstein given the filename prefix). The text features an interview with KGB officer Cherkashin discussing the handling of spy Robert Hanssen, comparing his 'uncontrolled' status to fictional moles, and referencing Edward Snowden's 2013 leaks. The page bears a timestamp of September 30, 2016, and the Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Cherkashin | KGB Officer/Handler |
Interviewee discussing spycraft and Robert Hanssen
|
| Robert Hanssen | Spy/Mole |
FBI agent who spied for the KGB; subject of the discussion
|
| Edward Snowden | Whistleblower/Source |
Mentioned in comparison to Hanssen regarding volume of documents taken
|
| Author/Interviewer | Interviewer |
The narrator asking Cherkashin questions (referenced as 'I')
|
Organizations (7)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| KGB |
Soviet intelligence agency receiving the secrets
|
|
| NSA |
National Security Agency, source of documents
|
|
| Department of Defense |
Source of documents taken by Snowden
|
|
| CIA |
Central Intelligence Agency, source of documents
|
|
| FBI |
Arresting agency of Hanssen
|
|
| SVR |
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Investigative body (inferred from Bates stamp)
|
Timeline (2 events)
Locations (4)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Refers to the Soviet/Russian government paying for secrets
|
|
|
Location of a tunnel compromised by leaked intelligence
|
|
|
Destination for secrets in Snowden hypothetical
|
|
|
Source of the secrets
|
Relationships (2)
Cherkashin discusses recruiting him and the value of his secrets.
Direct dialogue in the text.
Key Quotes (5)
"Control is not necessary in espionage as long as we manage to obtain the documents."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749.jpg
Quote #1
"We didn’t control him; he controlled us."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749.jpg
Quote #2
"Hanssen was by far our most valuable penetration in the Cold War."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749.jpg
Quote #3
"A ‘mole’ is a term used in spy fiction... We prefer the more general term ‘espionage source.’"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749.jpg
Quote #4
"If some unknown person simply delivered a trove of top secret communications secrets to the doorstep of Russia, would it be accepted?"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749.jpg
Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,129 characters)
Through the Looking Glass | 261
puter disks containing hundreds of secret documents revealing the sources and methods of American intelligence. According to Cherkashin, it was the largest haul of top secret documents ever obtained by the KGB (although it was only a small fraction of the number of top secret NSA, Department of Defense, and CIA documents taken by Snowden in 2013). Cherkashin told me the price paid by Moscow was a great bargain because it helped compromise “the NSA’s most advanced electronic interception technology,” including a tunnel under the Soviet embassy.
Yet it was only after newspapers reported that Hanssen had been arrested by the FBI in February 2001 that Cherkashin learned the name and position of the spy he had recruited. Cherkashin told me that what mattered to the KGB was not “control” of an agent but the value of the secrets he or she delivered. “Control is not necessary in espionage as long as we manage to obtain the documents.” So in the eyes of the KGB, anyone who elected to provide it with U.S. secrets was a spy.
“All we knew was that he delivered valuable documents to us and asked for cash in return,” he said. “We didn’t control him; he controlled us.”
An uncontrolled mole who provided secrets to the KGB and the SVR for twenty-two years was very different from fictional moles in the spy movies. I asked whether it would have been better if the KGB had him under its control.
“Possibly,” Cherkashin answered. “But as it turned out, Hanssen was by far our most valuable penetration in the Cold War.”
“Could Hanssen really be called a mole?” I asked.
“A ‘mole’ is a term used in spy fiction,” he said. “We prefer the more general term ‘espionage source.’”
“So anyone who delivers state secrets to the KGB, for whatever reason, is an espionage source?” I asked.
“Certainly, if the information is valuable to us,” Cherkashin answered.
“If some unknown person simply delivered a trove of top secret communications secrets to the doorstep of Russia, would it be accepted?” I asked with Snowden in mind.
Yet it was only after newspapers reported that Hanssen had been arrested by the FBI in February 2001 that Cherkashin learned the name and position of the spy he had recruited. Cherkashin told me that what mattered to the KGB was not “control” of an agent but the value of the secrets he or she delivered. “Control is not necessary in espionage as long as we manage to obtain the documents.” So in the eyes of the KGB, anyone who elected to provide it with U.S. secrets was a spy.
“All we knew was that he delivered valuable documents to us and asked for cash in return,” he said. “We didn’t control him; he controlled us.”
An uncontrolled mole who provided secrets to the KGB and the SVR for twenty-two years was very different from fictional moles in the spy movies. I asked whether it would have been better if the KGB had him under its control.
“Possibly,” Cherkashin answered. “But as it turned out, Hanssen was by far our most valuable penetration in the Cold War.”
“Could Hanssen really be called a mole?” I asked.
“A ‘mole’ is a term used in spy fiction,” he said. “We prefer the more general term ‘espionage source.’”
“So anyone who delivers state secrets to the KGB, for whatever reason, is an espionage source?” I asked.
“Certainly, if the information is valuable to us,” Cherkashin answered.
“If some unknown person simply delivered a trove of top secret communications secrets to the doorstep of Russia, would it be accepted?” I asked with Snowden in mind.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 261
9/30/16 8:13 AM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749
9/30/16 8:13 AM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019749
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