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when they hold such beliefs? Can they be made to feel less lonely by calling them to mind? More specifically, how does the influence of this construal on feelings of social isolation compare with that of other construals—for example, a construal that directly associates God’s creative influence with the irredeemable bad? How might the stronger sense of God’s presence in the hardships one suffers balance out in the latter case against the unhappy quality of the connection? Might one feel oneself to be better off alone, in other words, if God is as much one’s tormentor as one’s benefactor? Finally, comparable problems to the ones for belief surface in the more experience-driven God-as-friend outlook in Christianity, and make experimental testing pertinent.xix If the problem in both cases is that a strong sense of connection with God is hard to sustain—because God is invisible in the one case or crowded out by more obviously pressing matters in the other—how is the imaginative force of the idea of relationship with God better shored up? By imagining that one is on a date with God, or by imagining that God is always all around one like the air one breathes or the sun that shines? And what works for the greater number of people? What if the former imaginative capacities are hard to cultivate, and require in any case exceptional abilities of concentration or inward focus that many people lack? Might beliefs be easier for most people to hold in mind without sustained or disciplined practice? A simple visit to church or occasional perusal of a prayer book would do?

References

1 For the general importance of belief for such investigation, see the essays by W. Clark Gilpin and Tanya Luhrmann in this volume.

1 See Luhrmann in this volume.

1 Thomas Aquinas is one prominent theologian in the Christian tradition who highlights this idea: “creation . . . is the very dependency of the created act of being upon the principle [God] from which it is produced.” Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Two: Creation, trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), chapter 18, section 2, p. 55.

1 See again, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Two: Creation, chapters 31-38, pp. 91-115.

1 See, for example, Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians (1535), in Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 1964), vols. 26-27.

1 Thomas Aquinas again provides a clear theological exposition of this view. See, for example, his Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Three: Providence, Part 1, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), chapter 70, section 8, p. 237: “It is also apparent that the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural agent; rather, it is wholly done by both.”

1 For prominent examples of such a view in the history of Christian thought, see Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, trans. John Hammond Taylor (New York: Newman Press, 1982), chapters 10-12, pp. 49-51; and Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, trans. P. E. Pusey (Oxford: James Parker, 1874), Book 1, chapters 7-9, pp. 66-87.

1 See, for example, Athanasius, “On the Incarnation of the Word,” trans. Archibald Robertson, in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV, Second Series (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1957), sections 3-5, pp. 37-39.

1 See, for example, Gregory of Nyssa, “Answer to Eunomius’ Second Book,” trans. M. Day, in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds.), Nicene and Post-

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