HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023500.jpg
2.63 MB
Extraction Summary
3
People
2
Organizations
6
Locations
1
Events
1
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt or policy paper / evidence exhibit
File Size:
2.63 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 14 of a book, manuscript, or extensive policy paper regarding nuclear non-proliferation, marked as evidence with a House Oversight stamp. The text argues against the concept of 'global zero' (total disarmament), suggesting instead that US policy should focus on the 'character of the regimes' (like Iran and North Korea) rather than the weapons themselves. It recounts a conversation with an unnamed prime minister who admitted they would cheat on disarmament treaties.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Unnamed Prime Minister | Politician |
Quoted by the author admitting they would cheat on nuclear disarmament agreements.
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| Kim Jong-il | North Korean Leader |
Cited as an example of a dangerous regime possessing nuclear weapons.
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| Author (Unknown) | Writer/Narrator |
The 'I' in the text discussing nuclear policy and recounting a conversation with a prime minister.
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Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| US government |
Mentioned regarding the duty to deal with nuclear proliferation.
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| House Oversight Committee |
Indicated by the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023500' at the bottom.
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Timeline (1 events)
Unknown
Conversation between the author and an unnamed prime minister regarding nuclear disarmament cheating.
Unknown
Author
Unnamed Prime Minister
Locations (6)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Mentioned regarding nuclear weapons in 'Iranian hands' and 'Iranian clerics'.
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Cited as a comparative example of a safer country to hold nuclear weapons.
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Cited as a comparative example of a safer country to hold nuclear weapons.
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Mentioned regarding 'North Korean weapons'.
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Mentioned regarding weapons held by 'the French'.
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Mentioned regarding the 'US nuclear arsenal'.
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Relationships (1)
Author recounts a direct conversation/admission from the prime minister.
Key Quotes (4)
"“I would certainly cheat,” the prime minister said. “And so would all the others.”"Source
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Quote #1
"The problem is not the weapons but the character of the regimes that possess them."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023500.jpg
Quote #2
"Focus on the miscreants, on the few countries seeking nuclear weapons whose possession of them would be dangerous or destabilizing or both."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023500.jpg
Quote #3
"And don’t let them get away with the insulting notion that until we ourselves disarm we have no right to demand that they halt their clandestine programs"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023500.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,076 characters)
14
be handed over to some future international body, or destroyed. “I would certainly cheat,” the prime minister said. “And so would all the others.” I was in no way surprised by this admission.
I agree that the problem of nuclear proliferation is real. Dealing with it is an urgent and enormously important duty of the US government. But it is a mistake to define the problem in such a way as to suggest that any spread of nuclear weapons is dangerous or that nuclear weapons in Iranian hands should be regarded as the same as nuclear weapons in the hands of, say, Japan or Australia—or, for that matter, that the weapons themselves are the problem. Yet the proponents of global zero tend to deplore all nuclear weapons equally, no matter who holds them, and to regard any diminution of their number as a positive step because only subtraction leads to zero. But would a reduction in the number of North Korean weapons together with an increase in, say, those held by the French, yielding a net increase in the number of weapons, be a bad thing? The problem is not the weapons but the character of the regimes that possess them.
In many ways such a principle simplifies the proliferation problem and makes it less daunting. Focus on the miscreants, on the few countries seeking nuclear weapons whose possession of them would be dangerous or destabilizing or both. Sanction them. Isolate them. Undermine their regimes. Pressure them mercilessly. Do whatever it takes. But don’t offer to aid their “peaceful” nuclear programs in exchange for promises about weaponization that are so easily broken. And don’t let them get away with the insulting notion that until we ourselves disarm we have no right to demand that they halt their clandestine programs—as if the US nuclear arsenal poses the same danger to international peace and security as do the nuclear arsenals of the regimes of Kim Jong-il or the Iranian clerics.
The goal of zero nuclear weapons, often referred to by its sponsors as a “moral imperative,” inevitably delegitimizes and undermines
I agree that the problem of nuclear proliferation is real. Dealing with it is an urgent and enormously important duty of the US government. But it is a mistake to define the problem in such a way as to suggest that any spread of nuclear weapons is dangerous or that nuclear weapons in Iranian hands should be regarded as the same as nuclear weapons in the hands of, say, Japan or Australia—or, for that matter, that the weapons themselves are the problem. Yet the proponents of global zero tend to deplore all nuclear weapons equally, no matter who holds them, and to regard any diminution of their number as a positive step because only subtraction leads to zero. But would a reduction in the number of North Korean weapons together with an increase in, say, those held by the French, yielding a net increase in the number of weapons, be a bad thing? The problem is not the weapons but the character of the regimes that possess them.
In many ways such a principle simplifies the proliferation problem and makes it less daunting. Focus on the miscreants, on the few countries seeking nuclear weapons whose possession of them would be dangerous or destabilizing or both. Sanction them. Isolate them. Undermine their regimes. Pressure them mercilessly. Do whatever it takes. But don’t offer to aid their “peaceful” nuclear programs in exchange for promises about weaponization that are so easily broken. And don’t let them get away with the insulting notion that until we ourselves disarm we have no right to demand that they halt their clandestine programs—as if the US nuclear arsenal poses the same danger to international peace and security as do the nuclear arsenals of the regimes of Kim Jong-il or the Iranian clerics.
The goal of zero nuclear weapons, often referred to by its sponsors as a “moral imperative,” inevitably delegitimizes and undermines
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023500
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