HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019701.jpg
1.72 MB
Extraction Summary
2
People
11
Organizations
2
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book page / congressional exhibit (proof copy)
File Size:
1.72 MB
Summary
This is page 213 of a book (likely by Edward Jay Epstein, based on the filename 'Epst' and ISBN) marked as evidence for the House Oversight Committee. The text details the NSA's reliance on private contractors/ex-hackers for system administration and the security vulnerabilities created by moving sensitive data to networks to avoid 'stove-piping,' citing General Hayden and FBI Director Mueller. It lists major contractors including Booz Allen Hamilton and Microsoft who managed classified systems by 2013.
People (2)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| General Hayden | Former Head of the NSA |
Quoted regarding the NSA's shift to electronic storage and the resulting vulnerability.
|
| Robert Mueller | FBI Director |
Quoted from a statement regarding post-9/11 intelligence reorganization and the removal of 'stove-piping'.
|
Organizations (11)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; subject of the text regarding security practices and contractors.
|
|
| The Wall Street Journal |
Publication that interviewed General Hayden in 2015.
|
|
| FBI |
Federal Bureau of Investigation; mentioned in context of Director Mueller's statement.
|
|
| Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs |
Body to which Mueller gave his statement.
|
|
| 9/11 Commission |
Provided recommendations to make data more accessible.
|
|
| Booz Allen Hamilton |
Private company managing NSA classified computers; handled the most highly secret work.
|
|
| Dell SecureWorks |
Private company managing NSA classified computers.
|
|
| Microsoft |
Private company managing NSA classified computers.
|
|
| Raytheon |
Private company managing NSA classified computers.
|
|
| IBM |
Private company managing NSA classified computers.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
|
Timeline (2 events)
1996
Warning issued that hacking culture might provide a portal to anti-government hacktivist groups.
USA
2013
Management of NSA's classified computers handed over to private companies (Booz Allen Hamilton, etc.).
NSA
Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Centralized location for counterterrorism operations.
|
|
|
FBI locations across the country mentioned by Mueller.
|
Relationships (2)
General Hayden, who headed the NSA at the time
job of managing the NSA's classified computers had been handed over to... Booz Allen Hamilton
Key Quotes (3)
""All of us just fell in love with the ease and convenience and scale [of electronic storage]," General Hayden... said to The Wall Street Journal in 2015."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019701.jpg
Quote #1
""So we decided to take things we used to keep if not in a safe, at least in our desk drawer, and put it up here [in a computer network], where it's by definition more vulnerable.""Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019701.jpg
Quote #2
""One of the first steps was to centralize control and management of counterterrorism operations at headquarters to avoid the 'stove-piping' of information on terrorism cases in the 56 individual field offices across the country." - FBI Director Mueller"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019701.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,530 characters)
The NSA's Back Door | 213
including the hacking culture. Ex-hackers who lacked (or shunned)
employment opportunities in the corporate sector were suitable
candidates for the system administrator jobs that these firms had
contracted to supply the NSA. In the rush to expand, little heed was
paid to the 1996 warning that this hacking culture might provide
a portal to anti-government hacktivist groups. The NSA became
so enamored with this new computer technology that it neglected
the security implications of employing outsiders to service it. "All
of us just fell in love with the ease and convenience and scale [of
electronic storage]," General Hayden, who headed the NSA at the
time, said to The Wall Street Journal in 2015. "So we decided to take
things we used to keep if not in a safe, at least in our desk drawer,
and put it up here [in a computer network], where it's by definition
more vulnerable." Making matters even worse, as has previously
been discussed, the NSA stripped away much of the so-called stove-
piping that insulated highly sensitive data from the NSA's other
computer networks. FBI Director Mueller, in his "Statement Before
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs," described a decade of post-9/11 intelligence reorganization
thus: "One of the first steps was to centralize control and manage-
ment of counterterrorism operations at headquarters to avoid the
'stove-piping' of information on terrorism cases in the 56 individual
field offices across the country." Here the NSA was merely following
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to make their data
more accessible to other agencies concerned with potential terrorist
attacks, but as a result, the inner sanctum of the NSA became more
open to its new army of civilian technicians.
employment opportunities in the corporate sector were suitable
candidates for the system administrator jobs that these firms had
contracted to supply the NSA. In the rush to expand, little heed was
paid to the 1996 warning that this hacking culture might provide
a portal to anti-government hacktivist groups. The NSA became
so enamored with this new computer technology that it neglected
the security implications of employing outsiders to service it. "All
of us just fell in love with the ease and convenience and scale [of
electronic storage]," General Hayden, who headed the NSA at the
time, said to The Wall Street Journal in 2015. "So we decided to take
things we used to keep if not in a safe, at least in our desk drawer,
and put it up here [in a computer network], where it's by definition
more vulnerable." Making matters even worse, as has previously
been discussed, the NSA stripped away much of the so-called stove-
piping that insulated highly sensitive data from the NSA's other
computer networks. FBI Director Mueller, in his "Statement Before
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs," described a decade of post-9/11 intelligence reorganization
thus: "One of the first steps was to centralize control and manage-
ment of counterterrorism operations at headquarters to avoid the
'stove-piping' of information on terrorism cases in the 56 individual
field offices across the country." Here the NSA was merely following
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to make their data
more accessible to other agencies concerned with potential terrorist
attacks, but as a result, the inner sanctum of the NSA became more
open to its new army of civilian technicians.
By 2013, much of the job of managing the NSA's classified com-
puters had been handed over to a handful of private companies: Booz
Allen Hamilton, which handled the most highly secret work; Dell
SecureWorks; Microsoft; Raytheon; and IBM. In many respects,
these five companies acted less like management consultants and
more like temporary employment agencies in finding for the NSA
the computer specialists who had the necessary security clearances.
puters had been handed over to a handful of private companies: Booz
Allen Hamilton, which handled the most highly secret work; Dell
SecureWorks; Microsoft; Raytheon; and IBM. In many respects,
these five companies acted less like management consultants and
more like temporary employment agencies in finding for the NSA
the computer specialists who had the necessary security clearances.
The NSA found that the universe of independent contractors was
governed by very different considerations from that of intelligence
services. Unlike intelligence services, their fate depended on turning
governed by very different considerations from that of intelligence
services. Unlike intelligence services, their fate depended on turning
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 213
9/30/16 8:13 AM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019701
9/30/16 8:13 AM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019701
Discussion 0
No comments yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this epstein document