HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029723.jpg
1.66 MB
Extraction Summary
3
People
4
Organizations
6
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Government record/policy analysis (house oversight committee document)
File Size:
1.66 MB
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a geopolitical policy report or testimony produced for the House Oversight Committee. It analyzes the lack of diplomatic understanding between the West and Iran regarding nuclear doctrine since 1979, contrasting it with US-Soviet Cold War relations. It further predicts that Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, will seek their own nuclear weapons to deter Iran, drawing a parallel to France's nuclear strategy.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Iranian decision-makers | Government/Military Leaders |
Subjects of analysis regarding their views on nuclear weapons
|
| Western and Iranian scholars | Academics/Experts |
Groups with limited exchange of views since 1979
|
| American policymakers | Government Officials |
Compared to Iranians regarding early nuclear doctrine development
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States |
Mentioned regarding security partnerships and diplomatic exchanges
|
|
| Soviets |
Historical reference regarding Cold War arms control negotiations
|
|
| Saudi Arabia |
Identified as leading Gulf states in potentially seeking nuclear deterrents
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'
|
Locations (6)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Geopolitical region
|
|
|
Subject of nuclear deterrence analysis
|
|
|
Country likely to seek nuclear weapons
|
|
|
Region likely to seek nuclear weapons
|
|
|
Historical comparison regarding nuclear force
|
|
|
Reference to the Cuban missile crisis
|
Relationships (2)
References Cold War discussions and arms control negotiations.
Saudi Arabia likely to look for nuclear deterrents against Iran.
Key Quotes (2)
"it's not unreasonable to assume that the Iranians... will think of nuclear weapons as merely "big artillery.""Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029723.jpg
Quote #1
"Much like France wanted its own nuclear force de frappe during the Cold War, the Gulf states will want their own nuclear weapons to deter Iran."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029723.jpg
Quote #2
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,319 characters)
West, but we actually know little or
nothing about what Iranian decision-
makers think about nuclear weapons or
deterrence theory. Since the Iranian
revolution in 1979, opportunities for the
exchange of professional views between
Western and Iranian scholars,
policymakers, and military leaders on
these critically important issues have
been extremely limited. Therefore, it's not
unreasonable to assume that the Iranians,
like American policymakers in the early
stages of developing their nuclear triad
doctrine, will think of nuclear weapons as
merely "big artillery." Unfortunately, the
United States and its security partners
lack formal and informal exchanges with
the Iranians akin to the Cold War
discussions and arms control negotiations
between the Americans and Soviets,
which allowed both parties to develop
mutual understandings of the other's
perception of nuclear weapons. These
understandings were essential for crisis
management in the Cold War strategic
relationship after the Cuban missile
crisis.
Meanwhile, the Gulf states, led by Saudi
Arabia, are likely to look for their own
nuclear deterrents. Much like France
wanted its own nuclear force de frappe
during the Cold War, the Gulf states will
want their own nuclear weapons to deter
Iran. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf
nothing about what Iranian decision-
makers think about nuclear weapons or
deterrence theory. Since the Iranian
revolution in 1979, opportunities for the
exchange of professional views between
Western and Iranian scholars,
policymakers, and military leaders on
these critically important issues have
been extremely limited. Therefore, it's not
unreasonable to assume that the Iranians,
like American policymakers in the early
stages of developing their nuclear triad
doctrine, will think of nuclear weapons as
merely "big artillery." Unfortunately, the
United States and its security partners
lack formal and informal exchanges with
the Iranians akin to the Cold War
discussions and arms control negotiations
between the Americans and Soviets,
which allowed both parties to develop
mutual understandings of the other's
perception of nuclear weapons. These
understandings were essential for crisis
management in the Cold War strategic
relationship after the Cuban missile
crisis.
Meanwhile, the Gulf states, led by Saudi
Arabia, are likely to look for their own
nuclear deterrents. Much like France
wanted its own nuclear force de frappe
during the Cold War, the Gulf states will
want their own nuclear weapons to deter
Iran. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029723
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