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the heads of military intelligence and Mossad, to sign off on the operational
viability of the plan.

That was what now ended any prospect of military action, at least for a few
months. Bibi, Lieberman and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of
staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad
and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had
been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then
the full cabinet. But we asked each of them for their views on the operation. We
knew they had political reservations, along the lines of those voiced by Dan
Meridor. On an issue of this magnitude, it was accepted practice that military and
intelligence commanders could weigh in on the political implications as well. But
their formal role was operational and professional. Ashkenazi and the other
generals did concede that in every area – planning, materiel, training and
intelligence – our attack plan was far ahead of where it had been a year earlier. Yet
Ashkenazi, in particular, concluded that the preparations had not yet “crossed the
threshold of operational capability”.

I was furious. I respected the considered opposition of ministers like Dan or
Benny Begin. I had no problem with the chief-of-staff or other generals expressing
similar views on the political or geo-strategic implications of an Israeli attack, even
though our intelligence assessments suggested the concerns were almost certainly
unfounded. Yet what I found astonishing was Ashkenazi’s suggestion that the
“operational threshold” had not been crossed. Yes, this would be a demanding
mission. It was not without risks. No operation was. But having followed every
stage and detail of the preparations – and as a former chief of staff and intelligence
chief myself – I believed it was simply wrong on a professional level to say that
we lacked the capacity, and a workable plan, for a military strike if the order was
given.

Ashkenazi’s objection did mean there was no way we were going to attack at
least until well into the new year. Our discussions would continue, as would our
refinement and strengthening of the attack plan. So would Iran’s progress toward
its “zone of immunity,” which we now believed would begin late in 2012, a couple
of years away. As that point drew closer, we’d face an ever-more-pressing need to
decide finally whether military action was necessary.

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