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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 33 Filed 07/28/20 Page 5 of 7

The Honorable Alison J. Nathan
July 28, 2020
Page 5

a provision stating that it did not prohibit defense counsel from publicly referencing individuals
who had spoken on the public record in litigation relating to Jeffrey Epstein. Id. ¶ 4. Here, defense
counsel seeks permission to publicly identify any individuals who have self-identified as victims
of either the defendant or Epstein “to the media or in public fora, or in litigation”—a vastly broader
allowance. Indeed, as a comparison, none of the hypothetical examples described above would
have been subject to public naming and identification under the Epstein protective order, but every
single one would be under the defendant’s proposed order in this case.

Additionally, beyond the differences in the language itself, there are two significant
differences between the circumstances of the Epstein prosecution and this case. First, at the time
the Epstein protective order was entered, there were exceptionally few victims who had identified
themselves by name in litigation. Accordingly, the practical application of that provision was
extremely limited. Second, and related, in the time between when the Epstein protective order was
entered and the indictment in this case, many more victims have made public statements about
their victimization at the hands of Epstein, and the defendant, on their own terms and in their own
ways, including by exercising their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act in the context of
the dismissal of the indictment against Jeffrey Epstein following his suicide. Those victims could
not possibly have predicted, much less chosen, that their names would be publicly broadcast by
defense counsel in connection with a subsequent criminal case. Victims should be able to continue
to come forward, in the ways and in the venues they themselves choose, without fear of reprisal,
shaming, or other consequence arising from having their identities broadcast by defense counsel
in this case.

In sum, the requested modification to the Government’s proposed order sought by the
defendant is contrary to precedent and the compelling privacy interests of victims. Moreover, it is
without basis in fact or law, and, despite the Government’s repeated requests for clarity, the
defendant and defense counsel have offered no legitimate reason for their desire to be able to
publicly identify any number of victims, in the context of this criminal case and elsewhere, other
than a minimal, conclusory statement, without factual examples or legal support.³ At bottom, the
defendant and her counsel seek an unlimited ability to name victims and witnesses publicly, for no
discernible reason, and without justification or legal basis. The victims of Ghislaine Maxwell and
Jeffrey Epstein have suffered enough, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, applicable law, and
common decency compel far more protection of their privacy interests here than the defense
proposal would afford.

B. The Defendant’s Demand that the Government Restrict Use of its Own Documents

The defendant and her counsel also ask the Court to impose restrictions upon the
Government in its use, through potential witnesses and their counsel, of documents it currently
possesses, beyond the already-extensive restrictions and protections applicable to the

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³ To the extent defense counsel attempts to provide such examples or arguments for the first
time in a reply filing, the Government respectfully requests leave to reply to those examples or
arguments.

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