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Extraction Summary
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Document Information
Type:
Legal filing / court memorandum
File Size:
742 KB
Summary
This document is page 67 of a legal filing (Document 204) in the case United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell (Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE), filed on April 16, 2021. The text contains legal arguments regarding the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3283, specifically debating whether a 'categorical approach' or 'fact-based approach' applies to defining offenses involving sexual abuse. The prosecution argues that the defendant's interpretation would contradict Congress's intent to broadly prosecute crimes against children.
People (1)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| The Defendant | Defendant |
Refers to Ghislaine Maxwell (based on Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE). The document discusses legal arguments advanced by the...
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Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit | Court |
Court of Appeals cited for legal precedent (Weingarten case).
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| Supreme Court | Court |
References the U.S. Supreme Court's application of the 'categorical approach' in past statutes.
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| Eighth Circuit | Court |
Court cited in United States v. Countentos.
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| Congress | Legislative Body |
Mentioned regarding their legislative intent to 'cast a wide net' against offenses involving children.
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| DOJ | Government Agency |
Department of Justice (implied by Bates stamp DOJ-OGR-00003001).
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Relationships (1)
The document is a government filing arguing against legal interpretations advanced by the defendant.
Key Quotes (3)
"applying the categorical approach to Section 3283 would run contrary to Congress’s intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.”"Source
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Quote #1
"the interpretation the defendant advances would lead to absurd outcomes, as many federal crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors do not contain, as an element, a requirement that the defendant commit a sex act with a minor."Source
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Quote #2
"the phrase “sexual abuse” in Section 3283 refers to specific conduct, and not the statutory offenses charged in the Indictment."Source
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Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,205 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 67 of 239
‘Involving’ . . . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach.” 865 F.3d at 60 n.11
(citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach
to a statute containing the word “involves”)). Moreover, as the Weingarten court observed, the
Supreme Court has applied the categorical approach to statutes containing the word “involving”
where the statutes at issue also referenced “elements” of offenses, or specific prior “convictions,”
in a manner that referred to specific convictions, as opposed to particular offense conduct. 865
F.3d at 59 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1
(2004)). By contrast, the phrase “sexual abuse” in Section 3283 refers to specific conduct, and not
the statutory offenses charged in the Indictment.
(citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach
to a statute containing the word “involves”)). Moreover, as the Weingarten court observed, the
Supreme Court has applied the categorical approach to statutes containing the word “involving”
where the statutes at issue also referenced “elements” of offenses, or specific prior “convictions,”
in a manner that referred to specific convictions, as opposed to particular offense conduct. 865
F.3d at 59 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1
(2004)). By contrast, the phrase “sexual abuse” in Section 3283 refers to specific conduct, and not
the statutory offenses charged in the Indictment.
In Weingarten, the Second Circuit further noted that applying the categorical approach to
Section 3283 would run contrary to Congress’s intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many
offenses against children as possible.” 865 F.3d at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196). On
this point, it bears emphasizing that the interpretation the defendant advances would lead to absurd
outcomes, as many federal crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors do not contain, as an
element, a requirement that the defendant commit a sex act with a minor. It would run contrary to
Congress’s intent to interpret Section 3283 in a manner that would exclude many—if not most—
sexual offenses against children.
Section 3283 would run contrary to Congress’s intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many
offenses against children as possible.” 865 F.3d at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196). On
this point, it bears emphasizing that the interpretation the defendant advances would lead to absurd
outcomes, as many federal crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors do not contain, as an
element, a requirement that the defendant commit a sex act with a minor. It would run contrary to
Congress’s intent to interpret Section 3283 in a manner that would exclude many—if not most—
sexual offenses against children.
The lone Section 3283 case the defendant cites, United States v. Countentos, 651 F.3d 809
(8th Cir. 2011), is easily distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the Eighth Circuit considered,
among other issues, whether the crime of possessing child pornography involved sexual abuse
within the meaning of Section 3283. Id. at 816-18. In analyzing that question, the court discussed,
among a variety of factors, the elements of the crime. But it did not consider the categorical
approach, or purport to apply an “essential ingredients” test, as the defendant implies. Instead, the
(8th Cir. 2011), is easily distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the Eighth Circuit considered,
among other issues, whether the crime of possessing child pornography involved sexual abuse
within the meaning of Section 3283. Id. at 816-18. In analyzing that question, the court discussed,
among a variety of factors, the elements of the crime. But it did not consider the categorical
approach, or purport to apply an “essential ingredients” test, as the defendant implies. Instead, the
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DOJ-OGR-00003001
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