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730 KB

Extraction Summary

6
People
2
Organizations
2
Locations
3
Events
0
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal document
File Size: 730 KB
Summary

This legal document is a court opinion denying a defendant's post-trial motions. The court rejects the defendant's argument that a witness's (Jane's) testimony caused "ultimate prejudice" leading to improper convictions on Mann Act counts. The court also denies the defendant's claim of prejudicial pre-indictment delay, stating that the defendant failed to meet the stringent two-part legal test required to prove such a claim.

People (6)

Name Role Context
Jane Witness
Mentioned in the context of her testimony, which the Defendant argued resulted in prejudice.
Kaplan
Mentioned in a legal citation: "See Kaplan, 490 F.3d at 130."
Maxwell Defendant
Mentioned in a legal citation related to the Defendant's arguments: "Maxwell Br. at 18" and "Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d...
Kate Witness
Mentioned in the context of limiting instructions given at the time of her testimony.
Annie Witness
Mentioned in the context of limiting instructions given at the time of her testimony.
Cornielle
Mentioned in a legal citation: "United States v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 751 (2d Cir. 1999))."

Organizations (2)

Name Type Context
Court government agency
Referenced throughout as the decision-making body, explaining its reasoning for denying the Defendant's claims.
Government government agency
Mentioned as the prosecuting party, accused by the Defendant of excessive and prejudicial delay.

Timeline (3 events)

The trial where evidence was adduced and testimony was given by witnesses including Jane, Kate, and Annie.
Defendant Jane Kate Annie Court jury Government
The Defendant's pre-indictment delay claim, which the Court denies.
Defendant Court
The Defendant's argument that Jane's testimony resulted in prejudice and improper conviction.
Defendant Court

Locations (2)

Location Context
Mentioned as the jurisdiction whose law could form the predicate for the Mann Act counts.
Mentioned as a jurisdiction whose law could not form the predicate for the Mann Act counts.

Key Quotes (4)

"ultimate prejudice"
Source
— Defendant (The Defendant's characterization of the result of Jane's testimony.)
DOJ-OGR-00010403.jpg
Quote #1
"illegal sexual activity"
Source
— Court (A legal term on which the jury had been instructed, making further limiting instructions for Kate's and Annie's testimony unnecessary.)
DOJ-OGR-00010403.jpg
Quote #2
"substantial prejudice"
Source
— Court (The standard of prejudice the Court states the Defendant has not shown, which would be required to merit the vacatur of the Mann Act counts.)
DOJ-OGR-00010403.jpg
Quote #3
"the statute of limitations is ‘the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges,’"
Source
— Court (quoting precedent) (The Court's explanation for why the Defendant must satisfy a stringent test for a pre-indictment delay claim.)
DOJ-OGR-00010403.jpg
Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,152 characters)

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 37 of 45
request a continuance or object to Jane’s testimony until the charging conference suggests that she was not unfairly surprised. See Kaplan, 490 F.3d at 130. Accordingly, there is no indication in the record that the evidence adduced at trial unfairly surprised or prejudiced the Defendant.
Finally, the Defendant argues that Jane’s testimony resulted in the “ultimate prejudice” because it led to the jury improperly convicting her on three of the four Mann Act counts. Maxwell Br. at 18. For the same reasons noted above, the Defendant was not prejudiced by the Court’s response to the jury note because the ambiguous note did not reveal that the jury improperly convicted the Defendant of the Mann Act counts. Moreover, as explained above, the Defendant’s request for a limiting instruction in the jury charge and a supplemental instruction following the ambiguous jury note was unnecessary. While Kate’s and Annie’s limiting instructions were appropriate at the time of their testimony when the jury had not yet been instructed on the meaning of “illegal sexual activity,” it was unnecessary and potentially confusing to repeat them again in the context of the charge. At that point, the charge made clear to the jury that only a violation of New York law could form the predicate for the Mann Act counts—not New Mexico law. In sum, the Defendant has not shown that she suffered “substantial prejudice” meriting the vacatur of the Mann Act counts.
IV. The Court denies the Defendant’s pre-indictment delay claim.
Last, the Defendant argues, as she did in two pretrial motions, that all of her convictions should be vacated because of the Government’s allegedly excessive and prejudicial delay in prosecuting the Defendant. As this Court previously explained, because “the statute of limitations is ‘the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges,’” the Defendant must satisfy a stringent two-part test. Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 316 (quoting United States v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 751 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Defendant “must show both
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