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Extraction Summary
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Locations
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Events
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Quotes
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Summary
This document is a court transcript from a case filed on August 10, 2022, detailing a legal argument about jury instructions. An unnamed speaker contends that a specific instruction on causation for terms like 'persuasion' and 'inducement' would confuse the jury and is not required by precedent from the Broxmeyer case. In response, Mr. Everdell argues that such an instruction would not heighten the level of proof but would simply clarify the meaning of the words as they are used in the statute.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| MR. EVERDELL | Attorney |
Speaker responding to a legal argument made to the judge.
|
| Your Honor | Judge |
Addressed by MR. EVERDELL during a court proceeding.
|
| Broxmeyer |
Mentioned as the name of a legal case being discussed as precedent.
|
Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. | Company |
Listed at the bottom of the page as the court reporting service.
|
Timeline (1 events)
2022-08-10
A legal argument concerning jury instructions for the terms 'persuasion,' 'inducement,' 'enticement,' and 'coercion' and the required level of causation. The relevance of the 'Broxmeyer' case was debated.
Courtroom (implied)
Relationships (1)
MR. EVERDELL formally addresses 'Your Honor' to present a legal argument in a court setting.
Key Quotes (3)
"I don't think that this case stands for a particular, like, form of causal nexus that's required between "persuasion," "inducement," or "coercion" and the travel itself."Source
— Unnamed Speaker
(Arguing that the Broxmeyer case does not set a precedent that necessitates a specific jury instruction on causation.)
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Quote #1
"I think the jury will be confused by an instruction along those lines because it suggests that some amount of causation is required above the inherent causation in the statutory terms of inducement or enticement."Source
— Unnamed Speaker
(Expressing concern that a specific jury instruction on causation would confuse the jury.)
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Quote #2
"I don't think this is heightening the level of proof. I think this is simply -- the opinion is simply explaining what is required by those words, "persuasion," "inducement," "enticement," and those words are the exact same words that are used in the statute..."Source
— MR. EVERDELL
(Responding to the previous speaker, arguing that the proposed instruction clarifies, rather than elevates, the statutory requirements.)
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,697 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 765 Filed 08/10/22 Page 25 of 95
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1 different statute, it's quite a different statute. It's the
2 production of child pornography statute. And also, the
3 question in Broxmeyer was somewhat different. It was a
4 sufficiency of the evidence question about whether the
5 government's evidence showed that the persuasion or inducement
6 occurred before the production of the child pornography, and so
7 that's -- I don't think that this case stands for a particular,
8 like, form of causal nexus that's required between
9 "persuasion," "inducement," or "coercion" and the travel
10 itself. I think the jury will be confused by an instruction
11 along those lines because it suggests that some amount of
12 causation is required above the inherent causation in the
13 statutory terms of inducement or enticement. Those are words
14 of causation, but they are sort of words of causation in the
15 plain and ordinary sense and not in any greater or more
16 significant sense that I think a further instruction on that
17 point would suggest.
18 MR. EVERDELL: Your Honor, if I could just respond. I
19 don't think this is heightening the level of proof. I think
20 this is simply -- the opinion is simply explaining what is
21 required by those words, "persuasion," "inducement,"
22 "enticement," and those words are the exact same words that are
23 used in the statute, so I don't think the context of the case
24 really matters in terms of what those words mean. There may be
25 some inherent causation built into these words, but this is
2 production of child pornography statute. And also, the
3 question in Broxmeyer was somewhat different. It was a
4 sufficiency of the evidence question about whether the
5 government's evidence showed that the persuasion or inducement
6 occurred before the production of the child pornography, and so
7 that's -- I don't think that this case stands for a particular,
8 like, form of causal nexus that's required between
9 "persuasion," "inducement," or "coercion" and the travel
10 itself. I think the jury will be confused by an instruction
11 along those lines because it suggests that some amount of
12 causation is required above the inherent causation in the
13 statutory terms of inducement or enticement. Those are words
14 of causation, but they are sort of words of causation in the
15 plain and ordinary sense and not in any greater or more
16 significant sense that I think a further instruction on that
17 point would suggest.
18 MR. EVERDELL: Your Honor, if I could just respond. I
19 don't think this is heightening the level of proof. I think
20 this is simply -- the opinion is simply explaining what is
21 required by those words, "persuasion," "inducement,"
22 "enticement," and those words are the exact same words that are
23 used in the statute, so I don't think the context of the case
24 really matters in terms of what those words mean. There may be
25 some inherent causation built into these words, but this is
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
(212) 805-0300
(212) 805-0300
DOJ-OGR-00016951
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