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Extraction Summary
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Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
825 KB
Summary
This legal document, page 7 of a filing in case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE dated October 29, 2021, argues against the admissibility of certain types of expert opinion testimony from law enforcement officers. Citing numerous legal precedents, the document contends that testimony regarding alleged conspiracies, coded communications, witness credibility, and a defendant's mental state (specifically mentioning Ms. Maxwell) constitutes improper expert opinion. The argument concludes that such testimony is particularly prejudicial because juries may give undue weight to evidence presented by government agents.
People (10)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Daly |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1988)'.
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| Mejia |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'Mejia, 545 F.3d at 189-92'.
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| Levasseur |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1987)'.
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| Borrone-Iglar |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'United States v. Borrone-Iglar, 468 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1972)'.
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| Cruz |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1992)'.
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| Ms. Maxwell | Defendant (implied) |
Mentioned in the context of an opinion about whether she had a specific mental state or condition related to a crime.
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| Haynes |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 2013)'.
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| Garcia |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'Garcia, 413 F.3d at 216'.
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| Alvarez |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1988)'.
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| Casas |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2004)'.
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Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States | government agency |
Named as a party in multiple legal case citations, such as 'United States v. Daly'.
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Key Quotes (5)
"concerning the narcotics vernacular used in [recorded] telephone conversations"Source
— United States v. Borrone-Iglar
(Quoted as an example of testimony that constitutes expert opinion testimony.)
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Quote #1
"opinion about whether [Ms. Maxwell] did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone."Source
— Fed. R. Evid. 704(b)
(Quoted to argue against allowing expert opinion on a defendant's mental state.)
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Quote #2
"Testimony regarding whether the defendant ‘realized’ that there were drugs in the car was erroneously admitted because it is expert testimony about the defendant’s state of mind."Source
— United States v. Haynes
(Cited as precedent for why testimony about a defendant's mental state is inadmissible expert testimony.)
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Quote #3
"likely to give [their] factual testimony an ‘unmerited credibility’ before the jury."Source
— Mejia
(Quoted to argue that improperly limited testimony from law enforcement officers can unfairly bolster their credibility.)
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Quote #4
"When the expert is a government law enforcement agent testifying on behalf of the"Source
— United States v. Alvarez
(Part of a quote explaining the problematic nature of government agent testimony.)
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,518 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 393 Filed 10/29/21 Page 7 of 10
* Any testimony about the nature and structure of alleged conspiracies, or the nature and structure of alleged sex trafficking operations. See United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1988) (testimony about the nature and structure of organized crime is expert opinion testimony); see also Mejia, 545 F.3d at 189-92.
* Any testimony purporting to interpret the communications of others or “codes.” See United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1987) (testimony about the meaning of messages written in code is expert opinion testimony); United States v. Borrone-Iglar, 468 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1972) (testimony “concerning the narcotics vernacular used in [recorded] telephone conversations” is expert opinion testimony).
* Any testimony vouching for or bolstering the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1992) (improper for an expert to bolster government fact-witness’ credibility because such bolstering is irrelevant and prejudicial).
* Any “opinion about whether [Ms. Maxwell] did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b); see United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Testimony regarding whether the defendant ‘realized’ that there were drugs in the car was erroneously admitted because it is expert testimony about the defendant’s state of mind.”).
* Any testimony purporting to interpret the communications of others or “codes.” See United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1987) (testimony about the meaning of messages written in code is expert opinion testimony); United States v. Borrone-Iglar, 468 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1972) (testimony “concerning the narcotics vernacular used in [recorded] telephone conversations” is expert opinion testimony).
* Any testimony vouching for or bolstering the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1992) (improper for an expert to bolster government fact-witness’ credibility because such bolstering is irrelevant and prejudicial).
* Any “opinion about whether [Ms. Maxwell] did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b); see United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Testimony regarding whether the defendant ‘realized’ that there were drugs in the car was erroneously admitted because it is expert testimony about the defendant’s state of mind.”).
The above list is merely an example of the types of expert opinions law enforcement officers often try to offer at trial. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, though, any opinion testimony that is based on [REDACTED]'s specialized “training and experience” is expert opinion testimony subject to Rule 702 and Rule 16(1)(G) and is inadmissible at trial. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 216.
If the testimony of the government’s law enforcement officers is not properly limited, it is “likely to give [their] factual testimony an ‘unmerited credibility’ before the jury.” Mejia, 545 F.3d at 192 (2d Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1988) (“When the expert is a government law enforcement agent testifying on behalf of the
especially problematic because juries may place greater weight on evidence perceived to have the imprimatur of the government.
United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2004).
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