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Extraction Summary
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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
676 KB
Summary
This document is a page from a legal filing, dated October 29, 2021, which discusses the legal standards for the admissibility of expert testimony. It cites several legal precedents, including United States v. Felder and Kumho Tire, to argue that an expert's testimony can be based on personal experience and that it is generally the jury's role, not the court's, to resolve conflicting expert opinions. The document concludes by asserting that the rejection of expert testimony should be an exception.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Felder | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2021)'.
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| Williams | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Williams, 506 F.3d at 160'.
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| Daubert | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the context of the 'Daubert test'.
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| Phelps | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Phelps, 2020 WL 7028954, at *3'.
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| Floyd | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287'.
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States | government agency |
Party in the cited case 'United States v. Felder'.
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| Advisory Committee | committee |
Cited for its Note on Fed. R. Evid. 702, explaining the basis for expert testimony.
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| Kumho Tire | company |
Party in the cited case 'Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152'.
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| City of New York | government agency |
Party in the cited case 'Floyd v. City of New York'.
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Timeline (1 events)
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Mentioned in the case name 'Floyd v. City of New York'.
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Key Quotes (5)
"Such specialized knowledge can be grounded in scientific or other particularized training, but it can also derive from personal observations or experience... so long as those observations or experience are outside the ken of the average person."Source
— United States v. Felder
(Quoted to support the idea that expert testimony can be based on experience.)
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Quote #1
"experience alone—or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education"Source
— Advisory Committee's Note (2000)
(Quoted to explain that expert testimony may be based on experience.)
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Quote #2
"an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."Source
— Kumho Tire
(Quoted to state the key question for evaluating expert testimony.)
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Quote #3
"the range where the experts might reasonably differ,"Source
— Kumho Tire
(Quoted to argue that if testimony is within this range, the jury should decide, not the court.)
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Quote #4
"the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule."Source
— Floyd v. City of New York
(Quoted to argue that expert testimony should generally be admitted.)
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,982 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 8 of 84
particular case, the expert’s testimony will often rest upon an experience confessedly foreign in
kind to the jury’s own.” Id. at 149 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United
States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Such specialized knowledge can be
grounded in scientific or other particularized training, but it can also derive from personal
observations or experience, see id., so long as those observations or experience are outside the
ken of the average person.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 702,
Advisory Committee’s Note (2000) (explaining that expert testimony may be based on
“experience alone—or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or
education”).
The key question is whether “an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see
Williams, 506 F.3d at 160 (explaining that the Daubert test is “flexible”). In particular, if an
expert’s testimony is within “the range where the experts might reasonably differ,” the jury, not
the trial court, should be the one to decide among the conflicting views of different experts.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153. So long as the testimony is not “speculative or conjectural or
based on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in
essence an apples and oranges comparison . . . any other contentions that the assumptions are
unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony.” Phelps, 2020 WL 7028954,
at *3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “‘the rejection of expert testimony
is the exception rather than the rule.’” Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287
kind to the jury’s own.” Id. at 149 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United
States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Such specialized knowledge can be
grounded in scientific or other particularized training, but it can also derive from personal
observations or experience, see id., so long as those observations or experience are outside the
ken of the average person.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 702,
Advisory Committee’s Note (2000) (explaining that expert testimony may be based on
“experience alone—or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or
education”).
The key question is whether “an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see
Williams, 506 F.3d at 160 (explaining that the Daubert test is “flexible”). In particular, if an
expert’s testimony is within “the range where the experts might reasonably differ,” the jury, not
the trial court, should be the one to decide among the conflicting views of different experts.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153. So long as the testimony is not “speculative or conjectural or
based on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in
essence an apples and oranges comparison . . . any other contentions that the assumptions are
unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony.” Phelps, 2020 WL 7028954,
at *3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “‘the rejection of expert testimony
is the exception rather than the rule.’” Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287
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