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stake. I didn’t know whether peace was within reach. I was still deeply skeptical.
But if it was, we had to accept that Jerusalem would be key. And if the summit
failed, for whatever reason, what inevitably awaited us was “confrontation.”

Israel Hasson, the Shin Bet veteran, spoke first. He saw two choices. Either we
could retain Isrsaeli sovereignty over a “united Jerusalem” with functional, day-to-
day autonomy for the Palestinians in their neighborhoods, or we could in effect
divide the city. “Divide sovereignty.” He didn’t say which he favored, only that it
was essential that we made the decision now if we could, however difficult or
reluctant Arafat was as a negotiating partner. If we waited, we’d end up having to
deal with Islamists: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Oded Eran, the career diplomat
whom I’d put in charge of frustrating, formal talks with the Palestinians in the
months preceding the summit , said he was convinced that we should give the
Palestinians full sovereignty over at least the “outer” Arab neighborhoods in East
Jerusalem, which had become part of the city only when we’d expanded the city
boundaries after 1967. He said that was in Israel’s own interest. We had no historic
connection to these Arab villages, and something like 130,000 Palestinian lived
there. “Why should we want to annex them,” he asked. It would be like accepting
the “right of return” through the back door.

Dan Meridor’s voice, for me, was especially important. I knew he was as
determined as I was to try to get a peace agreement with the Palestinians. But he
was also a former Likudnik, and a native Jerusalemite. “I’m against any
concessions when it comes to Israeli sovereignty,” he said. “Any attempt to divide
Jerusalem would be a serious blow, and not just for Jews in Israel.” For centuries,
Jewish communities all over the world, had looked to Jerusalem, prayed for
Jerusalem. The yearly Seder meal, on Passover, ends with the Hebrew phrase:
Shanah haba b’Yerushalaim. Next year, in Jerusalem. “What we decided here in
Camp David,” Dan said, “also affects Jews in New York. In Moscow. In
Johannesburg.” He urged us to focus instead on offering Arafat as attractive as
possible a package of concessions on all the other issues. “Then let him decide.
But even if sovereignty over Jerusalem means that the deal collapses, I’m not
willing the pay that price.”

No voices were raised. It was the rarest of political discussions. People offered
their views, and listened to others’. Amnon Lipkin pointed out that a large area of
what was now came inside the boundaries of Jerusalem was not part of the city
he’d known before 1967. Echoing Oded Eran, he said: “It’s in our interest for as

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