Amnon Lipkin
PersonRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Ehud Barak
|
Succession |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Yitzhik Mordechai
|
Political alliance |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Ehud Barak
|
Professional military |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
The Narrator
|
Friend |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Ehud Barak
|
Business associate |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
Author
|
Professional successor |
1
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | Scheduled meeting between Amnon Lipkin and Shihabi. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Tze’elim accident/tragedy | Tze’elim | View |
| N/A | N/A | A nearly five-hour strategy discussion regarding the status of Jerusalem and peace negotiations. | Camp David (implied by cont... | View |
| 2025-07-13 | N/A | Tze’elim Incident | Tze’elim | View |
| 2025-02-01 | N/A | Key meeting regarding Golan Heights security arrangements. | Underground bunker in the k... | View |
| 2000-07-01 | N/A | Strategic discussion on Jerusalem boundaries and sovereignty. | Camp David (implied by cont... | View |
| 1968-03-01 | N/A | Battle of Karameh (Israeli attack on Fatah base) | Karameh, Jordan | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027949.jpg
This document appears to be page 101 from a memoir (likely by Ehud Barak, given the context of Sayeret Matkal and political connections to Amnon Lipkin) included in a House Oversight investigation. The text details the 1968 Battle of Karameh between Israeli forces and Fatah/Jordanian troops, describing the military operation, casualties, and the escape of Yasser Arafat. It serves as a historical account of Israeli military operations post-1967 War.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011855.jpg
This document appears to be a page (384) from a memoir or manuscript, likely by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by the header / BARAK / 98). It details the political situation in Israel following the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the Second Intifada (late 2000/early 2001). The text describes Barak's refusal to end the Oslo process at Ariel Sharon's demand, his reliance on the Shas party for a safety net in the Knesset, and his authorization of negotiators to continue peace talks under President Clinton's proposal despite escalating terrorist attacks (bombings in Jerusalem, Hadera, and Gaza) by Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp, indicating it was part of a production to the US Congress.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011833.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, marked with a House Oversight stamp. It details high-stakes internal discussions among the Israeli negotiating team (likely at the Camp David Summit in 2000) regarding sovereignty over Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, and the Old City. The text describes Barak's consultations with advisors like Danny Yatom and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak before presenting their 'red lines' to President Bill Clinton.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011832.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript (likely by Ehud Barak, based on the header) discussing high-level Israeli strategic discussions regarding the status of Jerusalem during peace negotiations (likely Camp David 2000). The text details the differing opinions of advisors Israel Hasson, Oded Eran, and Dan Meridor concerning Israeli sovereignty versus Palestinian autonomy in East Jerusalem. The page bears a House Oversight Committee stamp, suggesting it was collected as evidence, likely in relation to the investigation into Jeffrey Epstein's connections to high-profile figures like Barak.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011819.jpg
This document is page 62 from a manuscript or book by Ehud Barak, contained within House Oversight Committee files (likely related to Epstein investigations due to Barak's association, though Epstein is not mentioned on this specific page). The text details Barak's preparations for the Camp David 2000 Summit, the selection of his negotiating team (including Dan Meridor and Elyakim Rubinstein), and the logistical constraints imposed by President Clinton's schedule. It highlights Barak's strategy to include right-of-center political voices to legitimize potential concessions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011800.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or book manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by context and the header '/ BARAK / 43'). It details his inner circle and negotiating team, noting they were mostly military veterans of the 1967 and 1973 wars. The text reflects on the psychological impact of those wars on Israeli leadership and discusses the diplomatic stalemate with Syrian President Assad regarding the Golan Heights in late 1999. The document bears a House Oversight Bates stamp.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011783.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript (likely by Ehud Barak) included in House Oversight files. It details the political landscape of the 1999 Israeli elections, discussing the fragmentation of the right-wing government, the firing of Yitzhik Mordechai by Netanyahu ('Bibi'), the formation of the Center Party, and the launch of the 'One Israel' campaign alliance. It provides a snapshot of the candidates and the socio-political divisions within Israel at that time.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011755.jpg
This document is a page from a memoir (likely by Ehud Barak, given the context of being a former Chief of Staff and close to Peres) describing Israeli political and military events circa 1995-1996. It details Shimon Peres asking the narrator to run his election campaign and discusses high-level peace negotiations with Syria at Wye River. The text focuses heavily on the strategic military implications of withdrawing from the Golan Heights.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011742.jpg
This document is page 271 of a memoir, likely by Ehud Barak (identified as 'Ehud' and 'Chief of Staff'), marked with a House Oversight stamp. It details a July 13 television interview in Tel Aviv where the narrator defended himself against newspaper allegations regarding his conduct during the Tze’elim military disaster. The excerpt concludes with Yitzhak Rabin calling the narrator to offer support.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011741.jpg
This document is a page from a memoir (likely Ehud Barak's) designated as a House Oversight record. The narrator describes the political fallout following the Tze'elim tragedy, specifically his frustration with negative press in 'Yediot' and the lack of public support from Prime Minister Rabin. The text details his travel back to Israel via London, his coordination with aides to manage the media crisis, and the support he received from specific Knesset members while organizing a TV appearance.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011740.jpg
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir (Chapter 17) contained within House Oversight records. It details Barak's recollection of July 1995, when he was accused by the newspaper Yediot Achronot of abandoning soldiers during the Tze'elim training accident (an operation preparing for Saddam Hussein). Barak describes being in Beijing on a business trip with his brother-in-law Doron Cohen when the story broke, characterizing the accusations as a political ambush and a lie.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011736.jpg
This document appears to be a page (265) from a memoir or historical account written by a high-ranking Israeli military official (likely Ehud Barak, former Ramatkal). It details diplomatic negotiations with Syria, specifically interactions with General Shihabi and Muallem, and discusses security threats posed by Iraq, Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas, culminating in the mention of the kidnapping of soldier Nahshon Wachsman. While labeled with a House Oversight code often associated with Epstein document dumps, the text itself is purely geopolitical history regarding Israel.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028232.jpg
This document appears to be page 384 of a memoir or book by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), included in House Oversight evidence files. The text details the political fallout after the failure of the Camp David summit, Barak's refusal to form a coalition with Ariel Sharon due to disagreements over the Oslo process, and his reliance on a 'safety net' deal with the Shas party. It describes escalating violence by Islamic Jihad and Hamas in late 2000/early 2001 and Barak's decision to continue peace talks via negotiators (Ben-Ami, Sher, etc.) despite the violence, at President Clinton's insistence.
No Subject
Proposal regarding the Christian Quarter to be brought to Barak.
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