This legal document excerpt critiques the Second Circuit's interpretation of plea agreements, arguing it misread its own precedent in the 'Papa' case to create an "illogical" rule. This rule is contrasted with United States Supreme Court precedent from cases like 'Santobello' and 'Giglio', which establish that promises made by one prosecutor are binding on other prosecutors within the same office and must be disclosed.
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Gebbie |
Mentioned as having explained that Annabi misread a precedent.
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| Annabi | Party in a legal case |
Cited as a legal case that allegedly misread precedent and created an "illogical" rule.
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| Abbamonte | Party in a legal case |
Cited as a legal case referenced in the Annabi case.
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| Alessi | Party in a legal case |
Cited as a legal case referenced in the Annabi case, which in turn relies on Papa.
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| Papa | Party in a legal case |
Cited as a legal case that the Second Circuit has broadly interpreted regarding plea agreements.
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| Santobello | Party in a legal case |
Cited as a seminal Supreme Court case on plea bargaining.
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| Giglio | Party in a legal case |
Cited as a Supreme Court case (Giglio v. United States) regarding the duty to disclose promises of immunity.
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| Brady | Party in a legal case |
Referenced in the context of the 'duty under Brady' to disclose information, originating from the Brady v. Maryland c...
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| Assistant United Stated Attorney | Attorney |
Mentioned in the context of the Giglio case, where one AUSA had a duty to disclose a promise made by another AUSA.
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| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit | government agency |
Referenced as the court whose rule is being discussed, particularly its interpretation of the Papa case.
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| United States Supreme Court | government agency |
Cited as the authority on plea and immunity agreements, with reference to the Santobello and Giglio cases.
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| United States | government agency |
Mentioned as a party in the case 'Giglio v. United States'.
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"illogical"Source
"Papa, however, provides no support for the rule the Second Circuit follows. ... Although Papa held that the plea agreement did not bind other districts because the evidence revealed an intent to bind only one district, the Second Circuit apparently has broadly interpreted this case as meaning that plea agreements do not bind other districts absent an affirmative appearance of doing so. Papa does not explain or attempt to rationalize the rule that has evolved."Source
"[t]he staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done."Source
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