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744 KB
Extraction Summary
6
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
6
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
744 KB
Summary
This legal document, part of case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE filed on April 29, 2022, argues that two counts against the defendant (Count Three and Count Five) are multiplicitous and constitute double jeopardy. The argument is based on the government's own trial presentation, which framed the defendant's actions with co-conspirator Epstein as a single, decade-long conspiracy or "scheme." Citing legal precedents like Korfant and Josephberg, the document contends the proper remedy is for the court to enter judgment on only one of the two counts.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Epstein |
Mentioned as being in a "tight partnership" with the Defendant in a decade-long conspiracy to sexually abuse underage...
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| Defendant | Defendant |
The subject of the legal filing, accused of running a "playbook" in a conspiracy with Epstein. The document argues th...
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| Korfant |
Referenced in the context of the "Korfant factors," a legal test related to double jeopardy from a previous case.
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| Maslin |
Cited in a legal reference (See Maslin, 356 F.3d at 197) to support the argument that Count Five is not distinct.
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| Josephberg |
Cited in a legal reference (See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355) regarding the proper remedy for multiplicitous counts.
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| Ball |
Cited in a legal reference (Ball v. United States) regarding a defendant's right not to suffer multiple punishments f...
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Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Government | government agency |
The prosecuting party in the case, which presented a theory of a singular conspiracy to the jury.
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| Court | government agency |
The judicial body that is expected to impose judgment on the counts against the Defendant.
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| United States | government agency |
Mentioned as a party in the case citation "Ball v. United States".
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Timeline (2 events)
Key Quotes (6)
"several additional factors . . . not directly addressed in Korfant . . . further point toward a finding of double jeopardy,"Source
— unspecified legal source
(Quoted as part of an explanation of how factors beyond the Korfant factors can indicate double jeopardy.)
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Quote #1
"the fact that the Government, in its opening and closing arguments, presented both cases to the jury as broad conspiracies of an essentially identical nature."Source
— unspecified legal source
(Quoted as an example of an additional factor pointing toward double jeopardy.)
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Quote #2
"playbook"Source
— Government (attributed)
(Describing the common method the Defendant allegedly used over a decade.)
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Quote #3
"over and over and over again,"Source
— Government (attributed)
(Describing how the Defendant ran the common "playbook".)
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Quote #4
"scheme"Source
— Government (attributed)
(Used in reference to the singular conspiracy to abuse all victim witnesses.)
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Quote #5
"If the jury convicts on more than one multiplicitous count, the defendant’s right not to suffer multiple punishments for the same offense will be protected by having the court enter judgment on only one of the multiplicitous counts."Source
— Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355
(Cited as legal precedent for the proper remedy when counts are found to be multiplicitous.)
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Quote #6
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,188 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 15 of 45
first explained that applying the Korfant factors led to the conclusion that successive
prosecutions for conspiracies to distribute marijuana were barred by double jeopardy, but then
continued, stating that “several additional factors . . . not directly addressed in Korfant . . . further
point toward a finding of double jeopardy,” namely, “the fact that the Government, in its opening
and closing arguments, presented both cases to the jury as broad conspiracies of an essentially
identical nature.” 356 F.3d at 197. The same is true here. As explained above, the
Government’s opening statement and closing arguments presented a theory of a singular
conspiracy, highlighting: The degree of similarity between each victim witness’s experience
over a decade; the common “playbook” that the Defendant ran “over and over and over again,”
Trial Tr. at 2848; and the tight partnership between the Defendant and Epstein. And each of
those features was accompanied by references to a singular “scheme” to abuse all victim
witnesses. Id. at 36, 2843, 2853. At bottom, the case presented to the jury by the Government
was of a single decade-long conspiracy by the Defendant and Epstein to sexually abuse underage
girls. Having pursued such a broad and encompassing conspiracy, the Government cannot now
claim, and cannot carry its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, that Count
Five was legally and factually distinct. See Maslin, 356 F.3d at 197.
Because Count Three and Count Five are multiplicitous, the proper remedy is to enter
judgment on only one of the counts. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 (“If the jury convicts on
more than one multiplicitous count, the defendant’s right not to suffer multiple punishments for
the same offense will be protected by having the court enter judgment on only one of the
multiplicitous counts.” (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985))). Because Count
Five is factually subsumed by Count Three, the Court will impose judgment only on Count
Three. The Court emphasizes, however, that finding Count Five to be multiplicitous “does not
prosecutions for conspiracies to distribute marijuana were barred by double jeopardy, but then
continued, stating that “several additional factors . . . not directly addressed in Korfant . . . further
point toward a finding of double jeopardy,” namely, “the fact that the Government, in its opening
and closing arguments, presented both cases to the jury as broad conspiracies of an essentially
identical nature.” 356 F.3d at 197. The same is true here. As explained above, the
Government’s opening statement and closing arguments presented a theory of a singular
conspiracy, highlighting: The degree of similarity between each victim witness’s experience
over a decade; the common “playbook” that the Defendant ran “over and over and over again,”
Trial Tr. at 2848; and the tight partnership between the Defendant and Epstein. And each of
those features was accompanied by references to a singular “scheme” to abuse all victim
witnesses. Id. at 36, 2843, 2853. At bottom, the case presented to the jury by the Government
was of a single decade-long conspiracy by the Defendant and Epstein to sexually abuse underage
girls. Having pursued such a broad and encompassing conspiracy, the Government cannot now
claim, and cannot carry its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, that Count
Five was legally and factually distinct. See Maslin, 356 F.3d at 197.
Because Count Three and Count Five are multiplicitous, the proper remedy is to enter
judgment on only one of the counts. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 (“If the jury convicts on
more than one multiplicitous count, the defendant’s right not to suffer multiple punishments for
the same offense will be protected by having the court enter judgment on only one of the
multiplicitous counts.” (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985))). Because Count
Five is factually subsumed by Count Three, the Court will impose judgment only on Count
Three. The Court emphasizes, however, that finding Count Five to be multiplicitous “does not
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