HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020242.jpg

Extraction Summary

3
People
7
Organizations
4
Locations
4
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Investigative report / narrative summary (likely house oversight committee)
File Size:
Summary

This document page, likely from a House Oversight report, details the timeline and methods Edward Snowden used to steal classified NSA data in 2013. It covers his preparations in Hawaii, including deceiving Booz Allen about medical leave, obtaining colleagues' passwords through deception, and using automated 'spider' software to index over one million documents, many classified as Level 3 Sensitive Compartmented Information. The text highlights security failures, such as the lack of real-time auditing at the Hawaii base and the 'open culture' that facilitated password sharing.

People (3)

Name Role Context
Snowden Subject/Analyst
Edward Snowden; subject of the report detailing his theft of classified documents.
Mills Associate/Partner
Person Snowden helped pack possessions with in Hawaii.
Three fellow workers Colleagues
NSA/contractor employees who told the FBI Snowden may have deceived them to get passwords.

Organizations (7)

Name Type Context
Booz Allen
Snowden's employer; he requested medical leave from them.
National Threat Operations Center
Facility where Snowden began training and stole documents.
NSA
National Security Agency; the organization Snowden stole secrets from.
Dell
Snowden's previous employer where he was a system administrator.
FBI
Investigated the theft; interviewed Snowden's co-workers.
Congress
Informed by the NSA in 2014 regarding the password theft.
House Oversight
Indicated by the footer tag, likely the body reviewing this report.

Timeline (4 events)

April 13, 2013
Snowden returned to Hawaii.
Hawaii
April 15, 2013
Snowden began on-the-job training as an analyst.
National Threat Operations Center
April 30, 2013
Lease on Snowden and Mills' house expired.
Hawaii
May 18, 2013
Snowden departed for Hong Kong with stolen documents.
Hong Kong

Locations (4)

Location Context
Location where Snowden returned on April 13th and where the base was located.
Destination Snowden departed to on May 18, 2013.
Specific facility where the theft occurred.
Noted as lacking a real-time auditing system.

Relationships (2)

Snowden Domestic Partners Mills
Helping Mills pack up their possessions... The lease on their house was up.
Snowden Employee/Employer Booz Allen
Writing Booz Allen that he needed a brief medical leave... Booz Allen required a minimum of one month’s notice.

Key Quotes (4)

"Snowden carried out the heist with precision reminiscent of a “Mission Impossible” movie caper."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020242.jpg
Quote #1
"He needed to get passwords to up to 24 compartments at the National Threat Operation Center that he had not been “read into.”"
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020242.jpg
Quote #2
"Snowden’s spiders indexed well over one million documents."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020242.jpg
Quote #3
"Many of those that he copied and moved were from Level 3 “Sensitive Compartmented Information” according to the NSA analysis."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020242.jpg
Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (3,273 characters)

90
He returned on April 13th to Hawaii, One domestic task he to attend to was helping Mills pack up their possessions, which they stored in boxes in the garage. The lease on their house was up on April 30, 2013, so he found a temporary rental for them just a few blocks away.
On Monday April 15th, Snowden began on-the-job training as an analyst at the National Threat Operations Center—a training that he would not complete. The same week he began the training, he prepared his exit by writing Booz Allen that he needed a brief medical leave in May to undergo medical treatment for his putative epilepsy symptoms. Even though he had no planned any treatments, and, as far as is known did not suffer from epilepsy, Booz Allen required a minimum of one month’s notice for foreign travel. By making the request, he lessened the likelihood that it would arouse undue suspicion when he departed Hong Kong with stolen documents on May 18, 2013. This brief window left him some four weeks to take the lists that he coveted.
Snowden carried out the heist with precision reminiscent of a “Mission Impossible” movie caper. First, he needed to get passwords to up to 24 compartments at the National Threat Operation Center that he had not been “read into.” Even in the “open culture” of the NSA this was not an easy challenge since he no longer had a plausible pretext for asking other experienced threat analysts had their passwords, as he did when he was a system administrator at Dell. He would now be asking them to break strict NSA rules that prohibited intelligence workers from disclosing their passwords to an unauthorized party. In addition, they were supposed to report anyone who asked to use their passwords.
He may have obtained some passwords through deception, such as tricking them into typing in their passwords in a device that captured them. As the NSA informed Congress in 2014, three of his fellow workers told the FBI that Snowden may have deceived them to gain access their passwords. He may have also have used electronic means to have stolen the remaining passwords. In any case, however he accomplished this incredible feat, he gained access to 24 compartments containing the NSA’s most closely guarded secrets in a matter of a few weeks.
Next, he had to find the lists he was seeking in a vast sea of data. He used for this task pre-programmed robotic devices, called “spiders” to crawl through the data and find the files he was after. Snowden deployed these spiders soon after he began working at the Center, raising the possibility that Snowden had prepared in advance the operation. According to the subsequent NSA damage assessment, Snowden’s spiders indexed well over one million documents. Many of those that he copied and moved were from Level 3 “Sensitive Compartmented Information” according to the NSA analysis. The spiders also made his penetration relatively safe. As previously mentioned, the Hawaii base did not have a real time auditing system. So alarm bells would go off in the security office when he indexed documents.
Finally, Snowden had to find a way to transfer this data to a computer with an opened USB port. Most of the computers at the center had had their ports sealed shut to prevent unauthorized
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020242

Discussion 0

Sign in to join the discussion

No comments yet

Be the first to share your thoughts on this epstein document