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1.92 MB

Extraction Summary

7
People
1
Organizations
6
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Memoir draft / book excerpt
File Size: 1.92 MB
Summary

This document appears to be a page from a memoir by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, contained within House Oversight files. It details the failure of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria in March 2000, specifically focusing on a meeting in Geneva where President Bill Clinton presented a map to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. The text recounts Clinton's phone call to Barak reporting Assad's rejection of the proposal due to demands for access to the Sea of Galilee, and Barak's subsequent reflection on the failure with diplomat Dennis Ross.

People (7)

Name Role Context
Ehud Barak Narrator / Former Prime Minister of Israel
Author of the text (implied by 'BARAK' header and 'Ehud' address), discussing peace negotiations.
Bill Clinton US President
Mediator between Israel and Syria; met with Assad in Geneva.
Hafez al-Assad President of Syria
Negotiating partner who rejected the peace proposal; described as frail and ill.
Yitzhak Rabin Former Prime Minister of Israel
Mentioned regarding previous talks.
Bashar al-Assad Successor to Hafez al-Assad
Mentioned as the focus of succession.
Dennis Ross US Diplomat / Negotiator
Visited Barak in Jerusalem after the failed Geneva talks.
Yasser Arafat Palestinian Leader
Mentioned in the context of Barak's willingness to negotiate peace.

Organizations (1)

Name Type Context
House Oversight Committee

Timeline (2 events)

June 2000
Death of Hafez al-Assad (mentioned as occurring 'barely two months later').
Syria
Late March 2000
Summit in Geneva between President Clinton and Hafez al-Assad.
Geneva

Locations (6)

Relationships (2)

Ehud Barak Political/Diplomatic Bill Clinton
Clinton phoned Barak to update him on negotiations; they collaborated on the peace proposal.
Ehud Barak Diplomatic Dennis Ross
Ross visited Barak in Jerusalem to discuss the negotiation outcome.

Key Quotes (4)

"“Ehud, it’s not going to work,” he said."
Source
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Quote #1
"“The moment I started, he tuned out. He just said: ‘Do I get my land?’ I tried to get him to listen, but he just kept repeating: ‘Do I get all my land?’"
Source
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Quote #2
"Assad would countenance nothing less than being able to sit on the shore of the Sea of Galilee and “dip his feet in the water.”"
Source
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Quote #3
"“It’s not what we hoped for. But at least now we know.”"
Source
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Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,170 characters)

/ BARAK / 49
al-Hama, which I knew Assad had said he considered rightfully Syrian during talks
held under Rabin.
But the details turned out not to matter. President Clinton agreed to present the
map to Assad in what we both hoped would be a step to reopening the path for
peace. The two of them met in Geneva in late March. Though the President also
came with full details of our positions on the other negotiating issues, he began by
telling Assad that I had agreed to the Syrians’ longstanding point of principle on
our future border: it would be “based on the June 4, 1967 line” before the Six-Day
War. Then, the President unfurled the map.
It was shortly after five in the afternoon in Israel when Clinton phoned me. He
sounded as if he’d been punched in the stomach. “Ehud, it’s not going to work,” he
said. “The moment I started, he tuned out. He just said: ‘Do I get my land?’ I tried
to get him to listen, but he just kept repeating: ‘Do I get all my land?’ According
to the President, Assad would countenance nothing less than being able to sit on the
shore of the Sea of Galilee and “dip his feet in the water.” Clinton said he’d done
his best, and that was true. “I understand the effort is over,” I replied. “Probably,
he’s too frail and ill by now.” In fact, Assad would die of leukemia barely two
months later. His immediate focus was on ensuring an uncontested succession to
his son, Bashar.
When Dennis Ross came to see me in Jerusalem, I think he expected to find me
more distraught than I felt. Of course, I was disappointed. But I told him I was
grateful that Clinton had stayed with a negotiating effort that had been frustrating
for all of us. When I became Prime Minister, I’d assured the Americans that as
long as our vital security interests were protected, I was ready to go further than
any previous Israeli leader to get peace with Syria, and with Arafat too. I might
fail, but it would not be for lack of trying. I believed that even a “failure” would
tell us something: whether the other side was truly ready for peace. With Syria, I
told Dennis, “It’s not what we hoped for. But at least now we know.”
* * *
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