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does not include many other professional diaspora groups that may be used to facilitate China's influence operations.

Such Chinese groups have increased their activity in the United States since 2015,¹⁰ and many of these groups have had interactions with the United Front Work Department and other Chinese officials both in the United States and in China, contacts that are distinctly different from invitations to embassy or consular diplomats and bear further scrutiny.¹¹

[Image: Screenshot of a mobile interface]

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At least eleven of the chambers identified in this analysis were established in 2016 or later, consistent with heightened activity observed in other sectors of society dedicated to projecting China's soft power and influence abroad. (Tellingly, China's spending on diplomacy has doubled to $9.5b per year under Xi Jinping.)¹² The US-Zhejiang General Chamber of Commerce's WeChat description explicitly references a 2015 provincial directive on strengthening the province's overseas Chinese connections (see screenshot). Many of these groups maintain their own presence, via a website or, increasingly, the WeChat social media platform. In one instance, our researcher's antivirus software blocked an intrusion attempt while researching the US-Fujian Chamber of Commerce.

Chinese Companies Operating in America as a Vector of Influence

More than 3,200 Chinese-owned companies operate in the United States, employing 140,000 Americans.¹³ Chinese establishments operate in all but ten congressional districts.¹⁴ As Chinese companies' presence in the US economy grows, given the United Front's penchant for using civil society organizations for its purposes, they bring with them several potential risks. First, their potential to be used by Beijing may result in activities that are contrary to US interests, as evidenced by intense scrutiny of their investment activities by CFIUS and reported warnings by counterintelligence officials. Second, growing access to the US political system, even if currently used to advance legitimate economic interests, creates openings for future exploitation by the Chinese government. Third, Chinese companies may effectively "export" corrupt or unethical business practices.

Activities Contrary to US Interests

The technology sector has been the most consistent and prominent source of concern. In 2012, the Intelligence Committee of the US House of Representatives declared Chinese technology companies Huawei and ZTE a national security threat given the firms' alleged ties to the Chinese military and the potential for their technology to

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