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Extraction Summary
3
People
4
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Court filing (order/opinion)
File Size:
681 KB
Summary
This document is page 13 of a court order (Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN, United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell) filed on April 1, 2022. The Court is analyzing a motion regarding juror misconduct, specifically applying the *McDonough* test to determine if a juror's false answers during *voir dire* necessitate a new trial. The Court ultimately finds that the juror's false answers were not deliberate and proceeds to analyze the second prong of the test regarding bias (actual, implied, or inferable).
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ghislaine Maxwell | Defendant |
Referred to as 'Defendant' and via 'Maxwell Br.' (Brief); arguing regarding juror misconduct standards.
|
| Juror (Unnamed) | Juror |
Subject of the dispute regarding false answers provided during voir dire.
|
| Alison J. Nathan | Judge |
Implied by case number suffix 'AJN'; referred to as 'The Court' issuing the finding.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| The Government |
Argues that deliberate falsehood is required for juror misconduct.
|
|
| Second Circuit |
Cited for legal precedent (United States v. Shaoul, etc.).
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| National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers |
Filed a brief arguing deliberateness is not required (mentioned in footnote 3).
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| DOJ |
Department of Justice, referenced in footer 'DOJ-OGR'.
|
Timeline (2 events)
2022-04-01
Filing of Document 653 in Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN
US District Court (SDNY implied)
Relationships (1)
Opposing arguments in legal briefs regarding the McDonough test.
Key Quotes (3)
"the Court finds that the false answers were not deliberate and that the second prong of McDonough is not satisfied."Source
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Quote #1
"Actual bias is 'bias in fact,' due either to the juror admitting partiality or a judge finding actual partiality based on the juror’s voir dire answers."Source
DOJ-OGR-00020956.jpg
Quote #2
"Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse"Source
DOJ-OGR-00020956.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,390 characters)
Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page130 of 221
A-330
A-330
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 13 of 40
The parties dispute whether the first prong of McDonough requires “deliberate juror
misconduct”—that is, whether the juror must have deliberately provided a false answer in voir
dire. The Government, relying on Second Circuit precedent such as United States v. Shaoul,
argues that a deliberate falsehood is required. Gov. Br. at 13 (citing Shaoul, 41 F.3d at 815–16).
In contrast, the Defendant contends that McDonough does not require deliberateness and that an
inadvertent false statement satisfies the first prong. Maxwell Br. at 23–28; Maxwell Reply at 9–
14, Dkt. No. 644.3 The Court does not resolve this legal dispute because, as explained in the
analysis section below, regardless of which approach is the correct one, the Court finds that the
false answers were not deliberate and that the second prong of McDonough is not satisfied.
misconduct”—that is, whether the juror must have deliberately provided a false answer in voir
dire. The Government, relying on Second Circuit precedent such as United States v. Shaoul,
argues that a deliberate falsehood is required. Gov. Br. at 13 (citing Shaoul, 41 F.3d at 815–16).
In contrast, the Defendant contends that McDonough does not require deliberateness and that an
inadvertent false statement satisfies the first prong. Maxwell Br. at 23–28; Maxwell Reply at 9–
14, Dkt. No. 644.3 The Court does not resolve this legal dispute because, as explained in the
analysis section below, regardless of which approach is the correct one, the Court finds that the
false answers were not deliberate and that the second prong of McDonough is not satisfied.
Under the second prong of McDonough, the Court “must determine if it would have
granted the hypothetical challenge” for cause if the juror had responded accurately. United
States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 304
(2d Cir. 2006). “Challenges for cause are generally based on actual bias, implied bias, or
inferable bias.” Greer, 285 F.3d at 171. These categories do not always elucidate the analysis
and there is overlap (and sometimes confusion) in how they are discussed in some of the cases.
Nevertheless, it is important to attempt to delineate. Actual bias is “bias in fact,” due either to
the juror admitting partiality or a judge finding actual partiality based on the juror’s voir dire
answers. United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997). Implied bias is “bias
presumed as a matter of law” due to a juror’s relationship to the parties or connection to the
actual crime itself. Greer, 285 F.3d at 171–72. Finally, a judge may infer bias when actual or
implied bias does not apply. “Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a
risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse
granted the hypothetical challenge” for cause if the juror had responded accurately. United
States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 304
(2d Cir. 2006). “Challenges for cause are generally based on actual bias, implied bias, or
inferable bias.” Greer, 285 F.3d at 171. These categories do not always elucidate the analysis
and there is overlap (and sometimes confusion) in how they are discussed in some of the cases.
Nevertheless, it is important to attempt to delineate. Actual bias is “bias in fact,” due either to
the juror admitting partiality or a judge finding actual partiality based on the juror’s voir dire
answers. United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997). Implied bias is “bias
presumed as a matter of law” due to a juror’s relationship to the parties or connection to the
actual crime itself. Greer, 285 F.3d at 171–72. Finally, a judge may infer bias when actual or
implied bias does not apply. “Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a
risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse
3 In an amicus curiae brief, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers also argues that deliberateness is
not required under McDonough. See Dkt. No. 614.
not required under McDonough. See Dkt. No. 614.
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DOJ-OGR-00020956
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