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9
While petitioner emphasizes (Pet. 18) the paragraph
stating that Epstein sought "to resolve globally his
state and federal criminal liability," Pet. App. 25a, even
as to "his" federal liability specifically, the agreement
by its terms protected him from federal prosecution
only "in this District," id. at 26a; see id. at 9a (court of
appeals observing that "where the NPA is not silent, the
agreement's scope is expressly limited to the Southern
District of Florida"). The NPA's coconspirators clause,
which "also agrees" to forgo certain prosecution of co-
conspirators, cannot reasonably be construed as reflect-
ing some "global[]" scope broader than the Florida-
based state and federal charges that Epstein resolved
for himself. It would be extremely strange if the NPA
left Epstein himself open to federal prosecution in an-
other district—as eventually occurred, see p. 5, supra—
while protecting his coconspirators from prosecution
anywhere.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, such an implausible
reading cannot be inferred simply because the cocon-
spirators clause is one of the places where "the United
States" is used instead of "the United States Attorney"
or "the United States Attorney's Office." As noted above,
the NPA variously referred to the U.S. Attorney, the
USAO, and the United States, and at least some of those
uses of "the United States" plainly referred specifically
to the USAO. See, e.g., Pet. App. 26a (using terms in-
terchangeably in paragraph on notice); id. at 30a (not-
ing that Epstein had "agree[d]" "[a]t the United States'
request" to provide certain information); cf. Kirtsaeng
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 540 (2013)
("different words used in different parts of the same
statute [can] mean roughly the same thing"). The term
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