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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page38 of 93

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substantive criminal law,” “[p]rocedures in criminal cases are always those of the forum.”).5

In any event, Eleventh Circuit law would not support Maxwell’s claim. Maxwell does not cite any Eleventh Circuit decisions addressing when one U.S. Attorney’s Office is bound by a plea agreement with another U.S. Attorney’s Office. But in an analogous context, the Eleventh Circuit held that a U.S. Attorney’s promise made in a plea agreement—that a criminal defendant would not be deported—was unenforceable because the U.S. Attorney lacked authority to make that promise. San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1072 (11th Cir. 1996). If the Eleventh Circuit were to apply the reasoning of San Pedro to the issue in this case, it would likely reach the same result because a U.S. Attorney only has authority to act “within his district,” 28 U.S.C. § 547, and must seek the

5 Maxwell cites a handful of district court cases that apply the exclusionary rule of a foreign circuit to prevent, in her words, “the Government from parachuting into a new circuit and prosecuting a case it would not otherwise have been able to bring.” (Br.29). This “inter-circuit exclusionary rule,” as Maxwell calls it, is hardly a settled doctrine. See American Conflicts Law 391-94 (discussing cases in both directions). In any event, the purpose of this putative rule is tied to its context: “to ensure that the proper level of deterrence is maintained in the locale where the violation occurred.” (Br.29 (quoting United States v. Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. 180, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1995))). That rationale is inapplicable here.

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