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difficult. Genuine peace, and trust, would inevitably take years to reach fruition.
That was no mere academic problem in a conflict where, for decades, our
enemies had defined Israel’s mere existence as illegitimate. The reason for
Rabin’s reluctance to have his “deposit” presented as a set negotiating position
was that it meant dealing away our only card – territory – before the hard
questions about peace had been answered. When he phoned Christopher, I don’t
think I’ve ever heard him as angry. That was not what we agreed, he insisted.
He said it had spoiled any prospect of serious negotiations on the peace side of
the balance. Christopher didn’t agree there had been any real damage, nor that
Assad had failed to understand the context.

It might not have changed things anyway, since by this stage, the Oslo talks
had almost completed a draft agreement. In mid-August, Rabin gave Peres the
go-ahead to initial this “Declaration of Principles.” It provided for a period of
interim Palestinian self-government; the start of a phased Israeli withdrawal
from Gaza and the West Bank with the creation of a Palestinian police force to
deal with internal security; and a commitment to reach a full peace agreement
within five years. In early September, ahead of the formal signing of the Oslo
declaration, there was an exchange of “letters of recognition” between Arafat
and Rabin. Arafat’s letter also renounced “terrorism and other acts of violence”
and declared invalid “those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny
Israel’s right to exist.” A few days later, the signing ceremony was hosted by
President Clinton in Washington. Thus emerged the famous photo of Rabin and
Arafat shaking hands, on either side of Clinton, who was beaming, arms
outstretched in conciliation. They say a picture is worth a thousand words. In
this case, you needed barely a dozen. Rabin’s demeanor, his posture, the look
on his face, all seemed to say: “I would rather be shaking the hand of anyone on
earth than Arafat.” Still, the image was on front pages worldwide. The news
stories spoke of a new spirit of hope. Now that these old enemies had grasped
hands, surely a full peace agreement was within reach.

My feeling, as I watched it on TV in the kirya, was more guarded. I did hope
for peace, of course. I also recognized that the signing on the White House lawn
was just a beginning, and that my role would be to ensure that Israel’s security
needs were met under whatever formal peace agreement might eventually be
reached. And the security omens were hardly encouraging. Despite Oslo,
Palestinian attacks were continuing. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other dissident
factions saw Arafat’s concessions as treachery, and were setting out to drive
home that point with violence.

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