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Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page131 of 221
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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 14 of 40

the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.” Id. at 171
(quoting Torres, 128 F.3d at 47). The ensuing determination of whether the juror was biased or
prejudiced against the defendant may be “affected both by whether the nondisclosure was
deliberate and, if it was, by the juror’s motivation to conceal the truth.” United States v. McCoy,
995 F.3d 32, 51 (2d Cir. 2021); see also Greer, 285 F.3d at 172–73. It is important to consider
whether a juror’s answer was dishonest in the second part of the test “because it can show ‘a
personal interest in this particular case that was so powerful as to cause the juror to commit a
serious crime [by lying during voir dire].’” United States v. Nix, 275 F. Supp. 3d 420, 438
(W.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d sub nom. United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2021) (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1989)).

The McDonough inquiry is restricted by Federal Rule of Evidence 606, which states:

During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the
effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes
concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or
evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). As explained in this Court’s prior opinion, the rule is subject to certain
exceptions inapplicable here. See Feb. 25, 2022 Op. & Order, at 12. The rule, which embodies
“long-accepted Federal law,” is an important safeguard on the integrity of the jury trial system.
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1987) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the
rule). It enables “full and frank discussion in the jury room” and secures “jurors’ willingness to
return an unpopular verdict.” Id. Without the rule, the finality of verdicts, upon which the
system relies, would be seriously disrupted. See id. at 120–21, 124–25; see also Warger v.
Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 45, 49–50 (2014). And though not at issue in this case, the rule plays a

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