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Extraction Summary

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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes

Document Information

Type: Court filing / legal opinion (united states district court)
File Size: 651 KB
Summary

This page contains a legal analysis from a court document (Case 1:20-cr-00330, United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell) discussing the legal standards for 'variance' versus 'constructive amendment' of an indictment. It cites Second Circuit precedents (Banki, Rigas, Bastian, Salmonese, etc.) to establish that a defendant must prove substantial prejudice to reverse a conviction based on a variance claim. The text concludes by noting the Defendant is bringing a motion pursuant to Rule 33 to vacate judgment and grant a new trial.

People (2)

Name Role Context
Ghislaine Maxwell Defendant
Referred to as 'the Defendant' or 'she' in the text. Identified via Case No. 1:20-cr-00330-AJN.
Alison J. Nathan Judge
Presiding judge identified by initials 'AJN' in case number 1:20-cr-00330-AJN.

Organizations (3)

Name Type Context
United States District Court
Venue of the filing (Case 1:20-cr-00330)
Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Referenced multiple times in case citations (2d Cir.)
Department of Justice
Inferred from Bates stamp DOJ-OGR

Timeline (1 events)

2022-04-29
Filing of Document 657
SDNY
Defendant Court

Relationships (1)

Ghislaine Maxwell Legal Adversary United States Government
Defendant vs Prosecution in Case 1:20-cr-00330

Key Quotes (4)

"the defendant must show that 'the challenged evidence or jury instructions tied a defendant’s conviction to behavior entirely separate from that identified in the indictment.'"
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Quote #1
"a constructive amendment of the indictment is considered to be a per se violation of the grand jury clause, while a defendant must show prejudice in order to prevail on a variance claim."
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Quote #2
"when a defendant has sufficient notice of the Government’s theory at trial, she cannot claim that she was unfairly or substantially prejudiced."
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Quote #3
"the Court bears in mind that the Defendant brings her motion pursuant to Rule 33"
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Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,199 characters)

Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page180 of 221
A-380
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 23 of 45
Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 118 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 2007)). Thus, the defendant must show that “the challenged evidence or jury instructions tied a defendant’s conviction to ‘behavior entirely separate from that identified in the indictment.’” United States v. Bastian, 770 F.3d 212, 223 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Danielson, 199 F.3d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1999)).
By contrast, “[a] variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” Salmonese, 352 F.3d at 621 (quoting Frank, 156 F.3d at 337 n.5). “Although the distinction between constructive amendment and variance may appear ‘merely one of degree,’ there is an important difference in outcome: ‘a constructive amendment of the indictment is considered to be a per se violation of the grand jury clause, while a defendant must show prejudice in order to prevail on a variance claim.’” Id. (quoting Frank, 156 F.3d at 337 n.5); see also Rigas, 490 F.3d at 226 (“[A] defendant alleging variance must show ‘substantial prejudice’ to warrant reversal.”). “A defendant cannot demonstrate that [s]he has been prejudiced by a variance where the pleading and the proof substantially correspond, where the variance is not of a character that could have misled the defendant at the trial, and where the variance is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.” Khalupsky, 5 F.4th at 294 (quoting Salmonese, 352 F.3d at 621–22). Moreover, when a defendant has sufficient notice of the Government’s theory at trial, she cannot claim that she was unfairly or substantially prejudiced. See United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 119, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2007).
Finally, the Court bears in mind that the Defendant brings her motion pursuant to Rule 33, which permits the Court to “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of
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