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process, it was hedged with several conditions. The freeze would not be open-
ended, but last for 10 months, as a way of boosting the effort to restart
negotiations. It would apply to new construction, not work already underway. And
it would exclude the post-1967 neighborhoods inside the expanded city limits of
Jerusalem. Like his other moves, it was also dismissed as insignificant by the
Palestinians. Though there was a formal restarting of the talks, they went almost
nowhere during the period of the freeze, which Bibi cited as a reason for not
extending it further. From then on, the negotiations produced even less. I didn’t
buy the narrative that this was entirely Bibi’s fault. Abu Mazen remained
steadfastly, deliberately passive. Obviously not inclined to take the risk of further
widening his rift with Hamas in Gaza, he was content to echo the Obama
administration’s argument that nothing could happen until there was a settlement
freeze. Once the freeze was announced, he went through the motions, avoiding all
the difficult issues, in the expectation Washington would ensure the freeze was
renewed. President Obama’s initial Mideast moves had made it much easier for
Abu Mazen to avoid any serious engagement. In contrast to past presidents, Obama
had placed almost all of the onus for progress on Israel. But the end result also
suited Bibi. Though I never entirely gave up hope of persuading him it was in
Israel’s interest to seek a resolution of our conflict with the Palestinians, it became
more evident as the months went on that his aim was simply to keep things ticking
over, and avoid any major new crisis.

He appointed an old personal friend – a corporate lawyer named Yitzhak
Molcho – as our negotiator. I finally realized how pointless the exercise was when,
during a visit to the United States, I found myself in New York at the same time as
Molcho. We met at the Israeli consulate. We spoke in detail about the state of the
negotiations. With Molcho still in the room, I phoned Bibi in Jerusalem on the
secure phone line. I said I’d just been updated on the talks, and it seemed clear
there were a number of suggestions Israel could make, with no domestic political
risk but with every prospect of improving the atmosphere and accelerating
progress. “Yitzhak is one of Israel’s top lawyers,” I said. “He’s struck dozens of
deals in his life. But he strikes a deal when that’s what his client wants. You are the
client. If you tell him: bring me back the best deal you can – not a peace treaty, just
a deal on a specific issue – he’ll do it. But if his brief is simply to negotiate, he can
go on negotiating forever. And it’s pretty clear me that’s his brief.” Bibi insisted I
was wrong. He said that what I saw as time-wasting was simple prudence, to make
sure the negotiations bore fruit. But his approach never changed. Whenever it came

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