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14
Any disparity, however, is of limited importance be-
cause the scope of a plea or similar agreement is under
the control of the parties to the agreement. See Gebbie,
294 F.3d at 550 n.4. Accordingly, as the court of appeals
cases cited in the petition for a writ of certiorari indi-
cate, cases in which a default inference proves to be dis-
positive are unlikely to arise frequently. Indeed, several
of the cited cases did not themselves require application
of any default rule because the scope of the relevant
agreement was clear. See, e.g., Margalli-Olvera v. Im-
migration & Naturalization Serv., 43 F.3d 345, 352 (8th
Cir. 1994); see also Rourke, 74 F.3d at 807. And for the
reasons discussed above, this is not itself a case that
turns on any default rule.
Even assuming that "the United States" were pre-
sumptively a reference to the entire federal govern-
ment, the scope of the NPA's coconspirators clause
would nonetheless be clear. See Pet. App. 12a (court of
appeals finding "[n]othing in the text of the NPA or its
negotiation history" to support petitioner's claim); id. at
57a (district court describing petitioner's reading as "not
plausible-let alone 'affirmatively apparent") (quoting
Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672); pp. 8-12, supra. This Court
does not grant certiorari to "decide abstract questions
of law *** which, if decided either way, affect no
right" of the parties. Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S.
305, 311 (1882). And it has declined to do so in the face
of a claim similar to petitioner's. See Prisco, 562 U.S.
at 1290; Br. in Opp. at 6, Prisco, supra (Νο. 10-7895)
(explaining that "when read in context, the prosecutor's
general methodological question. The same was true in United
States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530
U.S. 1207 (2000), where a plea agreement explicitly bound only the
USAO. See id. at 1021.
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