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reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all
possible measures to prevent Syria from getting a nuclear weapon. An immutable,
core assumption in Israel’s security strategy was the need to retain our ability to
deter, and if necessary defeat, our enemies. A nuclear Syria – or Iraq, or Iran –
would dramatically alter the balance of power in the region, at obvious risk to
Israel. Syria posed a particular threat, as part of an increasingly close alliance with
Iran, and with Hizbollah in Lebanon.

The question, however, was how and when to strike the reactor. Olmert wanted
to attack within days. He seemed to assume that, as a former chief of staff, I’d nod
enthusiastically and go along with him. I did understand the reasons for his sense
of urgency. Not only did we have to make sure we attacked before the fuel was on
site. There was always the risk the Syrians would find out that we were aware of
their nuclear facility, putting them on even higher alert. But the operational
challenge was complex. We need a fail-safe plan to destroy the reactor. We had to
do it in such a way as to avoid a full-scale military confrontation with Syria if
possible. And we had to ensure we were ready for that, if it did happen. It took
very little time for me to realize that none of those prerequisites was yet in place.
Not unlike the recent Lebanon war, we were choosing between two off-the-shelf
plans from the kirya. One involved using a large military force, and would almost
certainly draw us into a major conflict with Syria. The other was a smaller,
targeted operation. But it remained untested, and there was no certainty it would
actually destroy the reactor.

Over the next few months, Olmert got more and more frustrated with the fact
we hadn’t yet attacked, and frustrated with me as well. We held dozens of
meetings, sometimes two or three a day, chaired by the Prime Minister, sometimes
by me as Defense Minister, or by the chief of staff or service commanders.
Invariably, I began my remarks by saying: “We have to destroy the reactor.” This
was not because I felt that any of us seriously doubted that. It was because Olmert
was beginning to suggest to the few ministers and senior officers aware of our
planning that I was against attacking the reactor. In fact, I was working with the
military and Mossad to ensure we had a plan that would succeed, with the
minimum possible risk of drawing us into a major clash with the Syrians after the
facility was destroyed. I was also working – with the help of the Americans – to
make sure we could get the forces and munitions in place in the north of Israel to

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