This document is page 116 from a memoir (likely Ehud Barak's 'My Country, My Life') marked with a House Oversight stamp. It details the initial response to the May 8, 1972, hijacking of a Sabena Boeing 707, including the narrator's mobilization of the Sayeret Matkal unit and a covert operation to disable the aircraft's landing gear at Lod Airport.
This document appears to be a page (106) from a memoir or book (likely 'Profits of War' or similar intelligence memoir) included in a House Oversight Committee production. The text narrates a covert Israeli military operation in the Sinai/Egypt involving the installation of a wiretap on a communications cable. The narrator communicates by radio with officers Digli and Avsha Horan at a command post at Gebel Um-Hashiba, debating whether to abort the mission due to delays before deciding to proceed.
This document appears to be page 100 of a memoir (likely by Ehud Barak) contained within House Oversight records. The text recounts the narrator's time as a physics student at Hebrew University following the Six-Day War, his consultation with intelligence officer Eli Zeira regarding his future military career and ambition to command Sayeret Matkal, and the emerging conflict with Yasir Arafat's Fatah organization along the Jordanian border.
This document appears to be a page from an autobiography (likely by former Israeli PM Ehud Barak, based on the mention of 'sayeret comrades' and Nechemia Cohen) included in House Oversight files. The text reflects on the cultural atmosphere of Tel Aviv in July 1967 following the Six-Day War and analyzes the author's own personality traits, specifically his emotional reserve and 'aloofness,' which critics later labeled as a 'touch of Aspbergers.' The page bears a House Oversight Bates stamp, indicating it was gathered as part of an investigation.
This document appears to be page 93 of a memoir (likely by Ehud Barak) produced as evidence for the House Oversight Committee. The text narrates the author's experiences during the Six-Day War (1967), detailing operations in the Golan Heights with Sayeret Matkal and a specific incident where the narrator commandeered a Syrian officer's Mercedes to gift to his colleague, Menachem Digli.
This document is page 77 of a memoir or historical account (likely by Ehud Barak, given the context of Israeli special operations) included in House Oversight evidence. It details the logistical challenges of a covert Israeli intelligence operation in the Sinai scheduled for February 1964, specifically focusing on waterproofing wiretapping equipment and designing a specialized cart to transport heavy gear from a helicopter landing zone without alerting Egyptian forces.
This document is page 76 of a memoir or historical account, stamped as a House Oversight exhibit. It details the planning of a covert Israeli military intelligence operation to wiretap Egyptian communications in the Sinai Peninsula during the 1960s. The text discusses the involvement of Meir Amit, Avraham Arnan, and Uri Yarom, and the utilization of Sikorsky S-58 helicopters for insertion.
This document is a page from a memoir or narrative, likely by Ehud Barak (given the references to Stanford and the Sayeret), produced during House Oversight proceedings. It details the planning of a covert Israeli military operation to bug Syrian communications lines in the Golan Heights, discussing logistical challenges like land mines and the nervousness of command. The text mentions key figures such as Avi Telem and Meir Har-Zion and references the narrator's later time at Stanford University.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or historical account (likely Ehud Barak's, given the context of Epstein document dumps containing his writings) describing the history of the Israeli special forces unit Sayeret Matkal. It details the suicide of captured soldier Uri Ilan in 1956, the subsequent ban on cross-border ops, the formation of Sayeret Matkal by 'Avraham,' and the recruitment of key historical figures like Meir Har-Zion. The narrator mentions joining the unit as a recruit in the summer of 1960. The page bears a House Oversight Bates stamp.
This document appears to be page 9 of a memoir manuscript, likely written by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (based on the biographical details provided: Sayeret Matkal, Intel Chief, Chief of Staff, PM). The text reflects on Israel's security history, the author's weekly strategy meetings with Yitzhak Rabin, and a past lecture regarding the 'window' for peace. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' stamp, indicating it was part of a document production for a US congressional investigation, likely related to the Epstein probe given Barak's known association.
This document is a page (page 9) from a memoir, identified by context as belonging to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. It recounts his history in the IDF (Sayeret Matkal, Intel Chief, Chief of Staff), his close working relationship with Yitzhak Rabin, and his strategic views on Israel's security and peace process. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp, indicating it was gathered as evidence in a congressional investigation, likely related to inquiries regarding Epstein's high-profile associates.
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir (page 132), submitted as evidence in a House Oversight investigation (Bates stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011889). The text details high-level, secret Israeli security cabinet ('Group of Eight') discussions in November 2010 regarding the Iranian nuclear threat. It describes a clandestine meeting at a Mossad villa where generals presented an attack plan, revealing a split between ministers who opposed the strike (Meridor, Begin, Ya'alon) and those who favored preparation (Barak, Netanyahu, Lieberman). While part of an Epstein-related document release, the text itself focuses strictly on Israeli geopolitical strategy.
This document appears to be page 131 of a manuscript (likely a memoir by Ehud Barak) produced during House Oversight proceedings. The text details the strategic deliberations within the Israeli government (specifically between Barak, Netanyahu, and Lieberman) regarding a potential preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities around 2010. It discusses the logistical challenges (tanker aircraft, munitions), the concept of a 'zone of immunity,' and the diplomatic complexities involving the Obama administration.
This document appears to be page 128 from a memoir by Ehud Barak, stamped as evidence by the House Oversight Committee (likely related to an investigation involving Epstein, though Epstein is not mentioned on this specific page). The text details Barak's time as Defense Minister in 2009, focusing on his facilitation of aid to the Palestinians (specifically Salam Fayyad) and his diplomatic role in smoothing relations between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration. It highlights his close relationships with US officials like Hillary Clinton and Bob Gates, contrasting his reception in Washington with that of Prime Minister Netanyahu.
This document is page 62 from a manuscript or book by Ehud Barak, contained within House Oversight Committee files (likely related to Epstein investigations due to Barak's association, though Epstein is not mentioned on this specific page). The text details Barak's preparations for the Camp David 2000 Summit, the selection of his negotiating team (including Dan Meridor and Elyakim Rubinstein), and the logistical constraints imposed by President Clinton's schedule. It highlights Barak's strategy to include right-of-center political voices to legitimize potential concessions.
This document appears to be a page (p. 52) from a memoir or manuscript by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, evidenced by the header '/ BARAK /'. The text details the strategic and operational decisions behind the Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanon on May 23, 2000. It describes interactions with Shaul Mofaz, the UN, and the tactical situation regarding Hizbollah and the Sheba'a Farms. The page is stamped with 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011809', suggesting it is part of a larger evidence file collected by the House Oversight Committee.
This document is a page from a memoir (likely Ehud Barak's) describing the failed rescue of hostage Nachshon Wachsman from Hamas in 1994. The narrator recounts the operational details, the death of officer Nir Poraz and the hostage, and the subsequent political fallout where Prime Minister Rabin took public responsibility. The text concludes with an emotional account of the narrator visiting the grieving parents and maintaining a relationship with them alongside his wife, Nava.
This document is page 131 of a memoir, likely by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), which discusses Israeli military strategy regarding Iran's nuclear program around 2009-2010. The text details the logistical challenges of preparing a surgical strike, the 'zone of immunity,' and the political alignment between Barak, Prime Minister Netanyahu ('Bibi'), and Foreign Minister Lieberman regarding the necessity of a military option despite the Obama administration's preference for negotiation. The document bears a House Oversight Committee stamp, suggesting it was collected as evidence in an investigation likely related to Barak's associations, though Epstein is not mentioned in the text of this specific page.
The document is page 128 from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak, marked with House Oversight Bates numbers. It details Barak's time as Israeli Defense Minister in 2009, focusing on his cooperation with Palestinian PM Salam Fayyad and his role as a diplomatic bridge between Prime Minister Netanyahu (Bibi) and the Obama administration (specifically Hillary Clinton and Bob Gates) regarding settlement freezes. Barak notes that Clinton described their relationship as 'longtime friends' during this period.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (page 117) included in a House Oversight production. It details the strategic disagreements between Barak (then Defense Minister) and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert regarding the timing and tactical execution of a preemptive strike on a Syrian nuclear reactor. Barak argues for a delay to ensure a 'fail-safe plan' that minimizes the risk of all-out war, while noting Olmert's frustration and urgency.
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