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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 32 Filed 07/28/20 Page 2 of 5

The Honorable Alison J. Nathan
July 28, 2020
Page 2

The defendant’s demand that she and her counsel be permitted to name any individuals who have
ever publicly identified themselves as a victim of either Epstein or the defendant in any “public
fora,” and at any time, without limitation, is extraordinarily broad, unnecessary, and inappropriate,
and should be denied.

As an initial matter, there can be no serious question that there are significant privacy and
victim interests at issue here, which the Government Proposed Order seeks to protect. Particularly
in the context of victim witnesses, there are compelling reasons to limit public disclosure of victim
identities and other sensitive information. Indeed, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3771, requires district courts to implement procedures to ensure that crime victims are accorded,
among other rights, “[t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused,” in addition to “[t]he
right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” Id. §§
(a)(1), (a)(8) (emphasis added). Moreover, “the public generally has a strong interest in protecting
the identities of . . . victims so that other victims will not be deterred from reporting such crimes.”
United States v. Paris, 2007 WL 1484974, at *2 (D. Conn. May 18, 2007).

Moreover, and consistent with those interests, courts in this Circuit have routinely
acknowledged the need to protect victim-witness identities. See, e.g., United States v. Corley,
13 Cr. 48 (AJN), 2016 WL 9022508, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (“Because Corley’s minor
victims have significant privacy and safety interests at stake, while Corley’s interests are minimal,
the Court finds good cause to modify the protective order in this case to prevent Corley from
learning the surnames of the minor victims.”); United States v. Kelly, 07 Cr. 374 (SJ), 2008 WL
5068820, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008) (“Given the potentially explicit nature of the government
witnesses’ expected testimony, the government argues that it is necessary to conceal their identity
to protect them from public humiliation and embarrassment. This Court agrees. Thus, the parties
[. . .] are hereby prohibited from releasing to anyone, including members of the press, the identity
or any identifying information of the government’s witnesses.”). It is similarly routine in this
District for parties in a criminal case to refer to witnesses by pseudonyms (such as “Victim-1” or
“Witness-1”) to protect the privacy interests of third parties unless and until they testify publicly.

The Government’s proposed order endeavors to protect those interests by generally
requiring the parties to abstain from identifying any victim by name in any public statement or
filing while also ensuring that the defendant and her counsel are fully able to prepare for trial.
Indeed, to facilitate the defendant’s investigation and preparation for trial, the Government’s
proposal makes clear that defense counsel and defense staff, including defense investigators,
should not be prohibited from referencing identities of individuals in conversations with
prospective witnesses, so long as those witnesses and their counsel abstain from further disclosing
or disseminating any such identities. See Government Proposed Order ¶ 5. The terms of the
Government’s proposed order also would permit defense counsel to refer to any individual by
name in any filing under seal, merely requiring redaction of identifying information or the use of
a pseudonym in public filings. The Government further proposes that defense counsel not be
prohibited from publicly referencing individuals who have spoken—or who at some future time

or deletes language in furtherance of its desire to publicly reference victim identities in defense
paragraphs 7, 9, and 17 (which are Government Proposed Order paragraphs 6, 7, and 16).

App.057

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