HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611.jpg
2 MB
Extraction Summary
2
People
9
Organizations
6
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Government report / appendix (house oversight committee production)
File Size:
2 MB
Summary
This document is a page (152, Appendix 2) from a House Oversight report analyzing Chinese state influence operations in Canada. It details how entities like the CCP International Liaison Department target Canadian politicians, academia, and civil society, while noting that Canada has been more resilient than Australia or New Zealand due to material factors and regulatory mechanisms. The text also discusses the geopolitical stance of the Liberal government elected in 2015 and references a 2010 CSIS warning regarding compromised provincial officials.
People (2)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Director of CSIS | Director of Canada's national security agency (in 2010) |
Stated that provincial cabinet members were under influence.
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| Provincial Cabinet Members | Government Officials |
Targets of improper interference according to 2010 CSIS statement.
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Organizations (9)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) |
Security Intelligence Service identified improper influence; investigating ongoing cases.
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| Chinese Intelligence Agencies |
Connected to community associations exerting improper influence.
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| CCP International Liaison Department |
Identified as a Chinese state actor targeting political parties.
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| Confucius Institutes |
Used for influence in civil society.
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| Chinese Students’ Association |
Used for influence in academia.
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| China Scholarship Council |
Supervises student recipients.
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| CSIS |
Canada's national security agency; produced a May 2018 report.
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| Liberal Government |
Elected Oct 2015, inclined to expand relations with China.
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| House Oversight Committee |
Document source indicated by footer stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
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Timeline (3 events)
Locations (6)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Primary subject of the analysis regarding foreign influence.
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Seat of Canadian government; referenced regarding current political views.
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Source of influence operations discussed.
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Compared to Canada regarding intensity of Chinese influence.
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Compared to Canada; subject of a May 2018 Canadian security report.
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Compared to Canada regarding power and mechanisms to resist influence.
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Relationships (2)
Liberal government inclined to expand relations; significant disagreements about risks of deeper relationship.
Canada's strategic center of gravity remains heavily tied to the United States.
Key Quotes (4)
"Today, the view in Ottawa is that China is definitely trying to influence Canadian opinion and opinion-makers but is not making much headway at present."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611.jpg
Quote #1
"In short, while facing similar influence and interference efforts from China, Canada—like the United States—appears to have more effective mechanisms... than Australia and New Zealand."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611.jpg
Quote #2
"The Liberal government elected in October 2015 is inclined to expand relations with China at the diplomatic and commercial levels..."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611.jpg
Quote #3
"In 2010, the director of CSIS, Canada’s national security agency, said at least two provincial cabinet members and other government officials were under the"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,915 characters)
152
(the Security Intelligence Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) identified improper influence through community associations connected to Chinese intelligence agencies and efforts to award politically connected Canadians in high-level roles with Chinese entities.¹ Today, the view in Ottawa is that China is definitely trying to influence Canadian opinion and opinion-makers but is not making much headway at present. At the federal level, the greatest concern with China has to do with the acquisition, often by legal means, of strategic Canadian assets such as oil sands or major companies.
As in other countries, Chinese state actors (the CCP International Liaison Department, commercial entities, media) have targeted political parties and politicians (with a few ongoing cases at the provincial and municipal levels that are being investigated by the RCMP), civil society (through Confucius Institutes and consular outreach), and academia (through the Chinese Students’ Association, China Scholarship Council supervision of student recipients, and pressure on Canadian China specialists). An informal survey of Canadian China professionals (political and business actors) and China specialists (research professionals) confirms some PRC state activity in all these realms. But no cases have yet reached the intensity or threat documented in Australia and New Zealand.
In large part, this difference in intensity is due to material factors: Canada is less dependent economically on China than Australia and New Zealand but smaller and less powerful than the United States. In short, while facing similar influence and interference efforts from China, Canada—like the United States—appears to have more effective mechanisms (diplomacy, election funding transparency, foreign investment regulations) than Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, in May 2018 Canada’s security service produced a report warning of the extent of interference in New Zealand.²
Politics
The Liberal government elected in October 2015 is inclined to expand relations with China at the diplomatic and commercial levels, including with some form of bilateral free trade agreement and deeper cooperation on global issues like climate change, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. Yet, despite Asia’s rising geoeconomic and geopolitical weight, Canada’s strategic center of gravity remains heavily tied to the United States and the transatlantic world and to Western perspectives. There are significant disagreements in the public and within government about the possibilities, opportunities, limits, and risks of a deeper relationship with China.
Media reports highlighting concerns over improper interference include the following:
• In 2010, the director of CSIS, Canada’s national security agency, said at least two provincial cabinet members and other government officials were under the
Appendix 2
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611
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