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Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page17 of 37

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“in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment is not sufficient.” Punn, 737 F.3d at 5. “Instead, the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment would imperil a substantial public interest or some particular value of a high order.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107; see also Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006). In a criminal case, the availability of post-judgment relief through reversal or vacatur of conviction, if warranted, will generally be sufficient to protect whatever right a defendant claims was abridged by the district court’s pretrial decision. See, e.g., Punn, 737 F.3d at 14 (“Punn’s claim can be adequately vindicated upon appeal from a final judgment. . . . [I]f Punn’s arguments continue to fail before the district court, purportedly ill-gotten evidence or its fruits are admitted at his trial, and conviction results, appellate review will be available at that point[,] . . . [and the Court] may order a new trial without the use of the ill-gotten evidence, or whatever additional remedies are necessary to ensure that Punn’s legitimate interests are fully preserved.”); United States v. Hitchcock, 992 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993) (district court’s refusal to seal documents not immediately appealable because “[r]eversal after trial, if it is warranted, will adequately protect . . . interest[s]” asserted by defendants).

When applying the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court has “generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise

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