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1.58 MB
Extraction Summary
4
People
5
Organizations
3
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / legal discovery document (page 154 of 'how america lost its secrets')
File Size:
1.58 MB
Summary
This document is a page (154) from the book 'How America Lost Its Secrets', marked with a House Oversight Bates stamp and an 'Epst' filename prefix, suggesting inclusion in the Epstein/Maxwell discovery materials. The text discusses theories regarding Edward Snowden's NSA breach, specifically exploring the possibility that he was unwittingly used as an 'umbrella' by an existing Russian/KGB mole within the NSA to hide their own activities. It references comments by former CIA station chief Tyler Drumheller and details a 2010 warning about a potential mole at Fort Meade.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Edward Snowden | Subject of text |
Former NSA contractor accused of breaching security compartments; discussed as potential 'umbrella' for other spies.
|
| Tyler Drumheller | Former CIA station chief |
Quoted suggesting Snowden may have carried out more documents than he knew about.
|
| Three co-workers | NSA employees |
Admitted to FBI they may have inadvertently given Snowden passwords.
|
| CIA Mole | Source |
Warned NSA about a potential Russian mole.
|
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| FBI |
Interviewed Snowden's co-workers regarding passwords.
|
|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; target of the breach.
|
|
| CIA |
Source of intelligence warning regarding Russian moles.
|
|
| Russian intelligence service / KGB |
Suspected of recruiting a mole at NSA.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Recipient of the document (indicated by Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT).
|
Timeline (2 events)
Locations (3)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Headquarters of the NSA.
|
|
|
Location where Snowden was working in 2010.
|
|
|
Country Snowden fled.
|
Relationships (2)
Drumheller comments on the nature of documents Snowden took.
Snowden worked for NSA, later breached their security.
Key Quotes (3)
"Snowden may have carried out of the NSA many more documents than he knew about"Source
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Quote #1
"Finding such a means to protect a source while exploiting his or her information is not uncommon in espionage operations"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019642.jpg
Quote #2
"This raises the more sinister possibility that the accomplice was not an amateur co-worker but a spy who was already in place when Snowden arrived."Source
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,304 characters)
154 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS
Three co-workers did admit to the FBI, as noted earlier, that they might have inadvertently given Snowden their passwords, but these three slips would not account for Snowden's breach of all the other compartments. Of course, there might have also been less forthcom-ing co-workers who hid their slips in divulging their passwords to Snowden.
This raises the more sinister possibility that the accomplice was not an amateur co-worker but a spy who was already in place when Snowden arrived. Such a penetration agent could have been recruited by an adversary intelligence service before Snowden came on the scene. After Snowden expressed a desire to expose the NSA's domestic surveillance, it could then have used him as an "umbrella" to hide its own activities. Finding such a means to protect a source while exploiting his or her information is not uncommon in espio-nage operations, and because Snowden was willing to flee America and go public, he could serve as a near-perfect umbrella. "Snowden may have carried out of the NSA many more documents than he knew about," Tyler Drumheller, the former CIA station chief, said. It could also account for the disparity between the claims of Snowden and the NSA damage assessment as to the number of documents that were compromised.
As far-fetched as this scenario may seem, less than three years before the Snowden breach the NSA had received a warning from a CIA mole (to be discussed in greater detail later) that the Russian intelligence service might have recruited a KGB mole at the Fort Meade headquarters of the NSA. No mole was found in 2010, and if one existed, it could not have been Snowden, who was working for the NSA in Japan in 2010. Such a putative mole could conceiv-ably have acquired enough information to later facilitate Snowden's operation.
As Snowden acknowledges, he was not a happy worker at the NSA. He complained in his posts over the Internet between 2010 and 2013 about superiors and what he considered NSA abuses to co-workers. If someone assumed the guise of a reluctant whistle-blower, he would have little difficulty in approaching Snowden. Snowden might not even know his true affiliation beyond that he
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 154
9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019642
9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019642
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