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Extraction Summary
4
People
5
Organizations
2
Locations
1
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal filing / court document (government response/memorandum)
File Size:
729 KB
Summary
This page is from a government legal filing (Document 295) in the case of USA v. Ghislaine Maxwell (1:20-cr-00330-PAE), filed on May 25, 2021. The text argues against the defendant's motion to dismiss charges based on a prior Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) with the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL). Citing the *Annabi* precedent, the government asserts that plea agreements are generally only binding in the specific district where they are signed, not universally across all federal districts.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| The defendant | Defendant |
Refers to Ghislaine Maxwell (Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE); arguing that a previous plea agreement should bind the current ...
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| Annabi | Legal Precedent Subject |
Refers to the case United States v. Annabi, used as the primary legal standard in this argument.
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| Abbamonte | Legal Precedent Subject |
Cited in United States v. Abbamonte.
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| Alessi | Legal Precedent Subject |
Cited in United States v. Alessi.
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Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit |
Court of Appeals whose precedents are being cited.
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| USAO-SDFL |
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida; the entity that executed the original NPA.
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| U.S. Attorney's Office |
General reference to federal prosecutors.
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| The Government |
The prosecution (Department of Justice).
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| United States |
Sovereign entity in the legal cases.
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Timeline (1 events)
2021-05-25
Filing of Document 295 in Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE
Court (Second Circuit jurisdiction)
Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Jurisdiction related to the USAO-SDFL and the original plea agreement/NPA.
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Current legal jurisdiction for this filing.
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Relationships (2)
Discussion of whether the NPA (Non-Prosecution Agreement) with USAO-SDFL protects the defendant in the current jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit articulated a universal principle in Annabi.
Key Quotes (4)
"The defendant is wrong. Annabi contains no such exception, and the Government is not aware of any court in this Circuit to apply such a rule."Source
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"Annabi explained that... 'the law has evolved to the contrary.'"Source
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Quote #2
"the default rule in this Circuit is that plea agreements bind only the district involved, absent an affirmative appearance to the contrary."Source
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Quote #3
"this Court has already concluded that, under Annabi, there is no affirmative appearance that the NPA binds entities aside from the USAO-SDFL."Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,167 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 7 of 26
district bringing the second prosecution charges offenses different from the offenses resolved by
the plea agreement in the first prosecution.” (Def. Mot. at 11) (emphasis in original). The
defendant is wrong. Annabi contains no such exception, and the Government is not aware of any
court in this Circuit to apply such a rule.
the plea agreement in the first prosecution.” (Def. Mot. at 11) (emphasis in original). The
defendant is wrong. Annabi contains no such exception, and the Government is not aware of any
court in this Circuit to apply such a rule.
In Annabi, the Second Circuit articulated a universal principle for interpreting whether a
plea agreement is binding outside the district where it was executed. Annabi explained that,
although it “might be thought” that a U.S. Attorney’s Office’s agreement which provided that ““the
Government’ will dismiss counts of an indictment” would bind the United States in every judicial
district, “the law has evolved to the contrary.” 771 F.2d at 672. Relying on several of its
precedents, the Court explained that the default rule in this Circuit is that plea agreements bind
only the district involved, absent an affirmative appearance to the contrary. Id. In particular, the
Second Circuit relied on its opinions in United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir.
1985), and United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960
(1976). Nothing about the reasoning of Annabi turned on whether the new case charged the same
offenses that were at issue in the original plea agreement or other offenses that might still be
covered by the plea agreement. The holding of Annabi is clear and straightforward, and this Court
has already concluded that, under Annabi, there is no affirmative appearance that the NPA binds
entities aside from the USAO-SDFL.
plea agreement is binding outside the district where it was executed. Annabi explained that,
although it “might be thought” that a U.S. Attorney’s Office’s agreement which provided that ““the
Government’ will dismiss counts of an indictment” would bind the United States in every judicial
district, “the law has evolved to the contrary.” 771 F.2d at 672. Relying on several of its
precedents, the Court explained that the default rule in this Circuit is that plea agreements bind
only the district involved, absent an affirmative appearance to the contrary. Id. In particular, the
Second Circuit relied on its opinions in United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir.
1985), and United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960
(1976). Nothing about the reasoning of Annabi turned on whether the new case charged the same
offenses that were at issue in the original plea agreement or other offenses that might still be
covered by the plea agreement. The holding of Annabi is clear and straightforward, and this Court
has already concluded that, under Annabi, there is no affirmative appearance that the NPA binds
entities aside from the USAO-SDFL.
The defendant now claims that when the Government brings charges that are similar to
those contained in a plea agreement, Annabi is silent, and that the Court is therefore free to apply
the opposite presumption, namely, that the plea agreement is universally binding on the
Government. The defendant’s argument rests exclusively on the phrase “identical to the dismissed
charges,” which appears in a paragraph in Annabi. (Def. Mot. at 11). The defendant’s reliance on
those contained in a plea agreement, Annabi is silent, and that the Court is therefore free to apply
the opposite presumption, namely, that the plea agreement is universally binding on the
Government. The defendant’s argument rests exclusively on the phrase “identical to the dismissed
charges,” which appears in a paragraph in Annabi. (Def. Mot. at 11). The defendant’s reliance on
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