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those offenses that were committed before the
enactment into law of the provision. On both points,
we disagree and hold that the District Court correctly
denied Maxwell's motions to dismiss the charges as
untimely. We review de novo the denial of a motion to
dismiss an indictment and the application of a statute
of limitations.20
First, Counts Three and Four of the Indictment are
offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors. The
District Court properly applied Weingarten v. United
States.21 In Weingarten, we explained that Congress
intended courts to apply § 3283 using a case-specific
approach as opposed to a "categorical approach."22
We see no reason to depart from our reasoning in
Weingarten. Accordingly, the question presented here
is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual
abuse of a minor for the purposes of § 3283 based on
the facts of the case. Jane, one of the women who
20 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 276, 278 (2d Cir.
2018).
21 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017); see also United States v.
Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d 299, 313 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
22 The "categorical approach" is a method of statutory inter-
pretation that requires courts to look "only to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts
underlying those convictions" for sentencing and immigration
purposes. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). We
properly reasoned in Weingarten that § 3283 met none of the
conditions listed by Taylor that might require application of the
categorical approach. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. First,
"[t]he language of § 3283[]... reaches beyond the offense and its
legal elements to the conduct 'involv[ed]' in the offense." Id. at 59-
60. Second, legislative history suggests that Congress intended
§ 3283 to be applied broadly. Id. at 60. Third, a case-specific
approach would not produce practical difficulties or potential
unfairness. Id.
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