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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 178 of 239

of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduced at trial, for ‘the sufficiency of the
evidence is not appropriately addressed on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776-77 (2d. Cir. 1998)).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 states in part that an indictment “must be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged . . . .”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). There are two constitutional requirements an indictment must satisfy in
order to be sufficient: first, it must “contain[] the elements of the offense charged and fairly
inform[] a defendant of the charge against which [s]he must defend,” and second, it must
“enable[]” a defendant “to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the
same offense.” United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (internal quotation
mark omitted) (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117). “[A]n indictment parroting the language of a
federal criminal statute is often sufficient . . . .” Id. at 109. As a general matter, “[a]n indictment
does not . . . ‘have to specify evidence or details of how the offence was committed.’” United
States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan, 18, 2017) (emphasis
in original) (quoting United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). “When
the charges in an indictment have stated the elements of the offense and provided even minimal
protection against double jeopardy,” the Second Circuit “has repeatedly refused, in the absence of
any showing of prejudice, to dismiss . . . charges for lack of specificity.” United States v. Stringer,
730 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (ellipses in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d. 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Although courts have identified certain crimes for which an indictment may require greater
specificity beyond tracking the language of the statute, such cases are “very rare.” Stringer, 730
F.3d at 125. For example, the Second Circuit has clarified that within this “less-common category”

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