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2.52 MB

Extraction Summary

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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Document Information

Type: Report page / policy analysis
File Size: 2.52 MB
Summary

This document describes the global trend of authoritarian regimes sharing "worst practices" to restrict NGOs, a tactic pioneered by Russia and adopted by others to limit civil society autonomy and foreign funding. It specifically details China's 2016 law regulating foreign NGOs, which introduced strict bureaucratic hurdles and police oversight amidst a broader crackdown on Western influence and human rights activists.

People (3)

Name Role Context
Xi Jinping
Yuan Guiren
Peter Dahlin

Timeline (4 events)

Cold War
Color revolutions
Adoption of China's 2016 NGO law
Arrest and televised confession of Peter Dahlin

Relationships (3)

to

Key Quotes (4)

"modern authoritarian regimes have turned this concept on its head by sharing their own experiences with laws and tactics that have the effect of retarding democratic development."
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"the Venezuelan Supreme Court spoke of foreign assistance as 'a typical manifestation of the interventionist policies of a foreign power to influence the internal affairs of the Venezuelan state.'"
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"The law gives the police sweeping powers to detain staff, restrict activities or events, or regulate an NGO’s ability to open an office."
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"Xinhua claimed that the activist, Peter Dahlin, had served a human rights organization that 'hired and trained others to gather, fabricate, and distort information about China.'"
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Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (4,931 characters)

Freedom House
Sharing worst practices
During the 1990s there was much discussion in the major democracies regarding the export of “best practices,” meaning the institutions, policies, and ways of doing things that had strengthened democratic governance in some of the more successful post-authoritarian societies, especially in Central Europe. More recently, modern authoritarian regimes have turned this concept on its head by sharing their own experiences with laws and tactics that have the effect of retarding democratic development.
Laws restricting the autonomy and funding of NGOs have been widely copied around the world. Many of the affected countries tolerated civil society activism in the period after the Cold War, only to move in a more repressive direction after the most prominent color revolutions alerted incumbent leaders to potential threat posed by civic activism. Once Russia had demonstrated a willingness to adopt legislation and then enforce it, other countries followed suit, first in Eurasia but subsequently in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Governments that adopt such laws seldom if ever shut down the civil society sector entirely. Instead, they deal with NGOs selectively, tolerating those that present no threat to the status quo, monitoring others, and repressing those that the leadership regards as a potential focus of opposition activity. Even some democracies, such as India, Indonesia, and Kenya, have enacted laws to strengthen state control over NGOs. But the most serious restrictions have been imposed by authoritarian regimes.¹⁵
According to a 2013 report, 12 countries had prohibited foreign funding for NGOs outright while another 49 placed restrictions on foreign donations.¹⁶ For authoritarian leaders, the imposition of foreign funding restrictions is a convenient tactic in that it makes it difficult for the organization to function effectively but falls short of an outright ban, which could attract sharper criticism. Furthermore, governments can justify their action on grounds of protecting sovereignty against foreign interference—a potent argument in an era when nationalist ideas have garnered greater public support. Thus in rejecting an appeal to government policies that restrict NGO work, the Venezuelan Supreme Court spoke of foreign assistance as “a typical manifestation of the interventionist policies of a foreign power to influence the internal affairs of the Venezuelan state.”¹⁷
China piles on
In early 2016, joining its authoritarian colleagues, China adopted its first formal law meant to regulate the country’s rapidly expanding NGO sector. Previously, foreign NGOs registered as commercial enterprises and conducted their advocacy work “off the books.” Under the new law, foreign NGOs are subject to a series of additional bureaucratic hurdles, some of which could seriously impinge on their work.
For example, foreign NGOs are now required to join in partnership with a Chinese organization. In practice, this could make it difficult for NGOs that work on sensitive issues like the rule of law to function, as Chinese organizations would be hesitant to join a foreign entity in pursuing such a politically explosive mission.
Moreover, foreign NGOs will be compelled to register with the police rather than the Ministry of Civil Affairs, as had been the case.¹⁸ The law gives the police sweeping powers to detain staff, restrict activities or events, or regulate an NGO’s ability to open an office.¹⁹ An NGO’s registration can be revoked under a vague clause that forbids spreading rumors, engaging in defamation, or publishing “other harmful information that endangers state security or damages the national interest.”²⁰
The new law was passed in the context of intensified repression, an economic slowdown, and a drive by the Xi Jinping leadership to suppress discussion of “Western ideas” in the media and at universities. Even as the country’s leadership boasted of China’s role as a world power, the country’s education minister, Yuan Guiren, felt compelled in 2015 to warn against the use of “textbooks promoting Western values” in Chinese classrooms.
Indeed, the authorities had carried out a series of arrests, focusing on precisely the sort of independent-minded activists with whom reform-oriented international NGOs would expect to collaborate: human rights lawyers, advocates for minority rights and religious freedom, and women’s rights campaigners.²¹ Around the time of the law’s adoption, the government took the unusual step of showcasing a televised confession by a Swedish citizen who had worked with legal reform groups in China. Xinhua claimed that the activist, Peter Dahlin, had served a human rights organization that “hired and trained others to gather, fabricate, and distort information about China.”²²
The adoption of formal restrictions on NGOs is one
www.freedomhouse.org
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