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Extraction Summary
6
People
2
Organizations
0
Locations
1
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal filing / court brief (motion or appeal)
File Size:
692 KB
Summary
This document is page 45 of a legal filing (Document 642) from Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell), filed on March 11, 2022. The text presents legal arguments regarding 'Inferred bias' and 'Actual bias' in jurors, citing the precedent case 'Torres' extensively. It argues that bias should be inferred when a juror's past experiences or conduct closely approximate that of the defendant, implying this legal standard applies to the current case (likely referring to Juror 50 in the Maxwell trial).
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Devery | Appellant (in cited case law) |
Defendant in the cited case 'Torres'; engaged in conduct similar to Juror No. 7
|
| Judge Preska | Judge (in cited case law) |
Concluded that Juror No. 7 might have felt threatened in the 'Torres' case
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| Juror No. 7 | Juror (in cited case law) |
Juror in the 'Torres' case whose 'structuring activity' was similar to the defendant's
|
| Judge Calabresi | Judge (in cited case law) |
Provided explanation on the scope of a trial judge's discretion to infer bias
|
| Torres | Case Name Subject |
Referenced in case citation 'Torres, 128 F.3d at 43'
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| Wood | Case Name Subject |
Referenced in case citation 'United States v. Wood'
|
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| District Court |
Mentioned in legal argument regarding errors in inferring bias
|
|
| DOJ |
Implied by footer 'DOJ-OGR'
|
Timeline (1 events)
Relationships (2)
reasonable for Judge Preska to conclude that the average person in Juror No. 7’s position might have felt personally threatened
similarity of Juror No. 7’s structuring activity to the conduct alleged against appellant Devery
Key Quotes (4)
"It is enough for the present to note that cases in which a juror has engaged in activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial are particularly apt."Source
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Quote #1
"The exercise of the trial judge’s discretion to grant challenges for cause on the basis of inferred bias is especially appropriate in such situations."Source
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Quote #2
"Actual bias is ‘bias in fact’—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality."Source
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Quote #3
"This is one such case."Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,899 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 45 of 66
district court did not err in inferring bias. Id. at 47-48. “Given the similarity of Juror No.
7’s structuring activity to the conduct alleged against appellant Devery in this case, it was
reasonable for Judge Preska to conclude that the average person in Juror No. 7’s position
might have felt personally threatened.” Id. at 48. Although the Court in Torres declined
to define the “precise scope of a trial judge’s discretion to infer bias,” Judge Calabresi
further explained:
7’s structuring activity to the conduct alleged against appellant Devery in this case, it was
reasonable for Judge Preska to conclude that the average person in Juror No. 7’s position
might have felt personally threatened.” Id. at 48. Although the Court in Torres declined
to define the “precise scope of a trial judge’s discretion to infer bias,” Judge Calabresi
further explained:
It is enough for the present to note that cases in which a juror has engaged in
activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial are
particularly apt. The exercise of the trial judge’s discretion to grant
challenges for cause on the basis of inferred bias is especially appropriate
in such situations.
activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial are
particularly apt. The exercise of the trial judge’s discretion to grant
challenges for cause on the basis of inferred bias is especially appropriate
in such situations.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
Just as it is “especially appropriate” for a court to infer bias when a potential juror
has engaged in “activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial,” so too
is it “especially appropriate” for a court to infer bias when a potential juror has been
subject to conduct “that closely approximate[d] [that] of the defendant on trial.” See id. In
such a case, there is just too great a risk that such a juror will not be able to decide the
case purely based on the applicable law and the evidence or lack of evidence, even
though that inability may be unconscious. This is one such case.
has engaged in “activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial,” so too
is it “especially appropriate” for a court to infer bias when a potential juror has been
subject to conduct “that closely approximate[d] [that] of the defendant on trial.” See id. In
such a case, there is just too great a risk that such a juror will not be able to decide the
case purely based on the applicable law and the evidence or lack of evidence, even
though that inability may be unconscious. This is one such case.
3. Actual bias
“Actual bias is ‘bias in fact’—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an
inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43
(citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)). “A juror is found by the judge
to be partial either because the juror admits partiality, or the judge finds actual partiality
inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43
(citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)). “A juror is found by the judge
to be partial either because the juror admits partiality, or the judge finds actual partiality
38
DOJ-OGR-00009737
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