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753 KB
Extraction Summary
12
People
4
Organizations
1
Locations
0
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal filing / court brief
File Size:
753 KB
Summary
This document is page 80 of a legal filing (Document 204) from Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell), filed on April 16, 2021. The text presents legal arguments regarding the dismissal of an indictment due to pre-indictment delay, citing numerous Second Circuit precedents (such as Cornielle, Alameh, and Delacruz) to establish that a defendant must prove the Government intentionally delayed specifically to gain a 'tactical advantage.'
People (12)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ghislaine Maxwell | Defendant (Implied) |
Implied subject of the case number 1:20-cr-00330-PAE mentioned in the header.
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| Cornielle | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent regarding intentional delay.
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| Alameh | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent regarding unjustifiable conduct.
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| Delacruz | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent regarding preindictment delay.
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| Martinez | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent regarding improper delay.
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| Hoo | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent.
|
| Lawson | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent.
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| Snyder | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent.
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| Watson | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent.
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| Tanu | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent.
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| Laurenti | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent.
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| Hillegas | Cited Case Defendant |
Cited in legal precedent.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit |
The court whose legal precedents are being cited.
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| Government |
Referenced as the entity that must not use delay for tactical advantage.
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| S.D.N.Y. |
Southern District of New York, cited in case law.
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| DOJ |
Department of Justice, indicated in the footer stamp.
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Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Jurisdiction of S.D.N.Y. and Second Circuit.
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Relationships (1)
The text discusses the legal burden a defendant must meet to prove the Government acted improperly against them.
Key Quotes (3)
"The Second Circuit has clearly held that a defendant seeking the dismissal of an indictment filed within the statute of limitations must establish that the Government acted intentionally, deliberately, or with some strategy, and that the Government used that delay to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant."Source
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Quote #1
"To show unjustifiable conduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the government has intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage."Source
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Quote #2
"Indeed, some version of the phrase 'deliberate device' and 'tactical advantage' is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on the issue."Source
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,217 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 80 of 239
The Second Circuit has clearly held that a defendant seeking the dismissal of an indictment
filed within the statute of limitations must establish that the Government acted intentionally,
deliberately, or with some strategy, and that the Government used that delay to gain a tactical
advantage over the defendant. See, e.g., Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (delay must be “intentional
device to gain [a] tactical advantage over the accused”); see also United States v. Alameh, 341
F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (“To show unjustifiable conduct, a defendant must demonstrate that
the government has intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage.”); see also United
States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Delacruz’s motion to dismiss
would nevertheless fail for the independent reason that he has not made any showing that the
preindictment delay was an intentional device designed by the Government to gain a tactical
advantage.”); United States v. Martinez, No. 94 Cr. 219 (RPP), 1995 WL 10849, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 12, 1995) (“In order to establish improper delay by the Government in filing an indictment, a
defendant must show that the delay was the result of an intentional device of the Government to
gain tactical advantage over the accused.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing
United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1987))). Indeed, some version of the phrase
“deliberate device” and “tactical advantage” is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on
the issue. See, e.g., Alameh, 341 F.3d at 176 (“intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical
advantage”); Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (requiring “intentional device” to gain “tactical
advantage”); Lawson, 683 F.2d at 694 (delay not “engineered by the government for an improper
purpose, such as gaining a tactical advantage”); Snyder, 668 F.2d at 689; United States v. Watson,
599 F.2d 1149, 1157 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Tanu, 589 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Laurenti, 581 F.2d 37, 40 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d
453, 460 (2d Cir. 1978).
filed within the statute of limitations must establish that the Government acted intentionally,
deliberately, or with some strategy, and that the Government used that delay to gain a tactical
advantage over the defendant. See, e.g., Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (delay must be “intentional
device to gain [a] tactical advantage over the accused”); see also United States v. Alameh, 341
F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (“To show unjustifiable conduct, a defendant must demonstrate that
the government has intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage.”); see also United
States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Delacruz’s motion to dismiss
would nevertheless fail for the independent reason that he has not made any showing that the
preindictment delay was an intentional device designed by the Government to gain a tactical
advantage.”); United States v. Martinez, No. 94 Cr. 219 (RPP), 1995 WL 10849, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 12, 1995) (“In order to establish improper delay by the Government in filing an indictment, a
defendant must show that the delay was the result of an intentional device of the Government to
gain tactical advantage over the accused.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing
United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1987))). Indeed, some version of the phrase
“deliberate device” and “tactical advantage” is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on
the issue. See, e.g., Alameh, 341 F.3d at 176 (“intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical
advantage”); Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (requiring “intentional device” to gain “tactical
advantage”); Lawson, 683 F.2d at 694 (delay not “engineered by the government for an improper
purpose, such as gaining a tactical advantage”); Snyder, 668 F.2d at 689; United States v. Watson,
599 F.2d 1149, 1157 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Tanu, 589 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Laurenti, 581 F.2d 37, 40 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d
453, 460 (2d Cir. 1978).
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