DOJ-OGR-00000053.tif
39.9 KB
Extraction Summary
0
People
5
Organizations
1
Locations
0
Events
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Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document / court opinion excerpt
File Size:
39.9 KB
Summary
This document is an excerpt from a legal document discussing the enforceability of plea agreements made by the U.S. Attorney's Office, particularly concerning whether such agreements bind the entire government or only the specific office involved. It contrasts the Ninth Circuit's view, which generally holds agreements binding on the whole government, with the Second and Seventh Circuits' opposite presumption, which limits enforceability to the specific U.S. Attorney's office unless explicitly stated otherwise. The text references case law such as United States v. Johnston and Annabi.
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. Attorney's Office |
bound by agreements, negotiates plea bargains
|
|
| Immigration and Naturalization Service |
bound by agreements
|
|
| Ninth Circuit |
cited approvingly to a legal proposition
|
|
| Second Circuit |
applies an opposite presumption regarding plea agreements; held a specific ruling
|
|
| Seventh Circuit |
applies an opposite presumption regarding plea agreements
|
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
where a government promise was enforceable
|
Key Quotes (3)
""the United States government as a whole uses United States Attorneys as its authorized agents to negotiate plea bargains in criminal cases, so their authorized agreements bind the government as a whole.""Source
DOJ-OGR-00000053.tif
Quote #1
""recognizing that although a plea agreement which specifically and expressly limits a non-prosecution promise to a particular U.S. attorney's office is enforceable only against that office, this is an exception to the general principle that a plea agreement is binding upon all districts.""Source
DOJ-OGR-00000053.tif
Quote #2
""They refuse to enforce a promise made on behalf of the “United States” or “the Government” except against the particular United States Attorney's office which entered into the agreement, unless the agreement expressly reiterates that the term “United States” does in fact mean the entire country as a whole.""Source
DOJ-OGR-00000053.tif
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,672 characters)
11
U.S. Attorney's Office on behalf of the "Government"
(defined in that agreement to include its "depart-
ments, officers, agents, and agencies") binds not
just the office of the U.S. Attorney but also the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 35 F.3d at
1337-38. Although the plea agreement in that case
defined broadly that all governmental agencies would
be bound, the Ninth Circuit cited approvingly to the
broader proposition that "the United States govern-
ment as a whole uses United States Attorneys as
its authorized agents to negotiate plea bargains in
criminal cases, so their authorized agreements bind
the government as a whole." Id. at 1340. See also
United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1020-21
(9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that although a plea
agreement which specifically and expressly limits a
non-prosecution promise to a particular U.S. attor-
ney's office is enforceable only against that office, this
is an exception to the general principle that a plea
agreement is binding upon all districts).
B. The Second and the Seventh Circuits apply
the opposite presumption. They refuse
to enforce a promise made on behalf of
the "United States" or "the Government"
except against the particular United States
Attorney's office which entered into the
agreement, unless the agreement expressly
reiterates that the term "United States"
does in fact mean the entire country as a
whole.
Second Circuit. In the decision below, in reliance
on Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, the Second Circuit held
that the government's promise that the "United
States" would not prosecute any of the defendant's
co-conspirators was only enforceable in the Southern
DOJ-OGR-00000053
U.S. Attorney's Office on behalf of the "Government"
(defined in that agreement to include its "depart-
ments, officers, agents, and agencies") binds not
just the office of the U.S. Attorney but also the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 35 F.3d at
1337-38. Although the plea agreement in that case
defined broadly that all governmental agencies would
be bound, the Ninth Circuit cited approvingly to the
broader proposition that "the United States govern-
ment as a whole uses United States Attorneys as
its authorized agents to negotiate plea bargains in
criminal cases, so their authorized agreements bind
the government as a whole." Id. at 1340. See also
United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1020-21
(9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that although a plea
agreement which specifically and expressly limits a
non-prosecution promise to a particular U.S. attor-
ney's office is enforceable only against that office, this
is an exception to the general principle that a plea
agreement is binding upon all districts).
B. The Second and the Seventh Circuits apply
the opposite presumption. They refuse
to enforce a promise made on behalf of
the "United States" or "the Government"
except against the particular United States
Attorney's office which entered into the
agreement, unless the agreement expressly
reiterates that the term "United States"
does in fact mean the entire country as a
whole.
Second Circuit. In the decision below, in reliance
on Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, the Second Circuit held
that the government's promise that the "United
States" would not prosecute any of the defendant's
co-conspirators was only enforceable in the Southern
DOJ-OGR-00000053
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