This document analyzes North Korea's nuclear program, arguing that its tests are practical steps toward functional deterrence rather than mere political signaling, much like U.S. strategy during the Cold War. It contrasts Western views of nuclear weapons as political instruments with the strategic realities of nations like North Korea, Russia, China, and Iran, who view them as vital for national defense.
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Soviet Union | ||
| North Korea | ||
| NATO | ||
| United States | ||
| House Oversight Committee |
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
"North Korea's mission requires small, lightweight warheads, and missiles that work -- and the only way to know that they work is to test them."Source
"Today, a sound strategy for dealing with North Korea should not ascribe ulterior motives to acts that the United States once considered rational and routine."Source
"The view that nuclear weapons are merely political instruments -- suitable for sending signals, but not waging wars -- is now so common in Washington, London, and Berlin that it is hard to find anyone who disagrees."Source
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