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Edwards adv. Epstein
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages

ARGUMENT

II. THE RECORD AND PROFFERED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT EDWARDS'S CONDUCT COULD NOT POSSIBLY FORM THE BASIS OF ANY LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF EPSTEIN

A. The Summary Judgment Standard.

Rule 1.510(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a court may enter summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions and factual showings reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Snyder v. Cheezem Development Corp., 373 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Rule 1.510(c), Fla. R. Civ. P. Once the moving party conclusively establishes that the nonmoving party cannot prevail, it is incumbent on the nonmoving party to submit evidence to rebut the motion for summary judgment. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966). It is not enough for the opposing party merely to assert that an issue of fact does exist. Fisel v. Wynns, 667 So.2d 761, 764 (Fla.1996); Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979) (same).

Moreover, it is well-recognized that the non-moving party faced with a summary judgment motion supported by appropriate proof may not rely on bare, conclusory assertions found in the pleadings to create an issue and thus avoid summary judgment. Instead, the party must produce counter-evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. See Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc., 479 So.2d 165, 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also Lanzner v. City of North Miami Beach, 141 So.2d 626 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1962) (recognizing that mere contrary allegations of complaint were not sufficient to preclude summary

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